Paternalism is the source of the French labor crisis.

Heir Capitalism, Thomas Philippon’s French Labor Crisis, Republic of Ideas, la République des Idées, Seuil, 2007.

We are continuing to analyze the functioning of the systems of power and first and foremost that of the capitalist, liberal and currently neo-liberal system. Industrial and commercial enterprises form the basis for this. The way they work depends on the development of the economy and the development of social relations or the development of social conflicts and the waste of resources used for the production and distribution of wealth.

Since 2007, we have been using this book by Thomas Philippon in our economics courses and we present a summary of this book and our comments on fileane.com. We are here facing the French labor crisis and its main cause: the social conflict between the private owners of the means of production and the employees. At the heart of this conflict we find the mistakes of the 1789 revolution that we have just seen, as well as the conflict that concerns the definition of Authority and the mission of authority and has as a consequence an antithesis between the freedom of the heads of enterprise, that of the leaders of the capitalist system and the freedom of the employees, of the citizens.

Leaders look down on their staff. There is no conviviality.

A vicious circle that feeds and sustains mistrust

The author paints an objective portrait of social relations in France by stressing the idea that we are caught in a vicious circle that fuels and maintains mistrust. What distinguishes France from other countries is the lack of satisfaction that employees derive from their work and the bad opinion that employees and employers have of each other. The difficulties of French capitalism thus reflect that of society in general: everywhere we note the same inability to bring about powerful organizations where social relations are based on mutual trust. The author insists that this is not the responsibility of a minority of paternalistic leaders, but rather a system of organization with its own logic, which must be understood as the fruit of a collective history. In this system and in this history, family capitalism has a central place.

The failure of French management to create productive social relations

The most visible behaviors of the paternalistic culture are the absence of delegation, overburdening of responsibilities at the top, disempowerment of the grassroots, difficulties of adaptation and internal promotion.

This criticism is directed at French companies, but it is even stronger in state-run organizations. These weaknesses are not new: they were already the object of critical life before World War I, when the French economy was losing ground to the German economy.

The realization of the failure of French management to create productive social relations re-emerges after the Second World War when the Marshall Plan was implemented. At the time of reconstruction, AFAP (French Association for the Increase of Productivity) is sending a mission to the United States to understand the causes of the differences in labor productivity with France. What does she find out? That France’s main backlog is not technological, but it is concentrated in human resources management.

American experts sent to France as part of the Marshall Plan focus their criticism on French business leaders and bosses. Recalling that the constructive attitude of the workers in the United States depends first and foremost on the constructive attitude of the management, they criticize, in particular, the French leaders for opposing any constructive change, for failing to leave sufficient responsibility and authority to their subordinates. Generally speaking, the French are not aware of the direct link between a high level of productivity and the application of sound human relations methods.

The poor quality of social relations in France is a characteristic that emerges from all available surveys, and in a sustainable manner.

The author uses a number of international investigations conducted by consultancies. It mainly uses the IMD survey, a business school in Lausanne, and the World Economic Forum survey, the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). The EMI of France ranked 57th out of 60 countries in 2004 for the quality of industrial relations (last among the rich countries). And, according to the GCR, it ranks 99th out of 102 countries. Only Venezuela, Nigeria and Trinidad do worse… The poor quality of social relations in France is a characteristic that emerges from all available surveys, and in a sustainable manner.

This perception is shared by the French in general and by employees in particular. Among European countries, France ranks last for “the freedom to make decisions in one’s work,” and second last (ahead of Greece) for “job satisfaction.” Such pessimism does not affect all issues. The French are well aware of what is going well in France, and they do not have a particularly negative view of their life in general. By contrast, like business leaders, French employees recognize that there is a specific problem with social relations. There is a French exception. 

The fundamental opposition between those who rule and those who obey.

There is a win/lose logic here and this attitude is fed by very strong opinions on the fundamental opposition between those who rule and those who obey. These anti-labor attitudes are expressed in remarks and stereotypes: “a hard worker is at best ‘too good,’ at worst a lackey of big money, a moron who can be exploited.”

In the public sector, too, “as soon as a professor becomes principal, he moves into the enemy camp. Instead of saying, “He’s one of us who did it, we’ll be better understood,” they are suspicious because he thinks he has crossed the fence.”

Managers can only be happy in this way by repressing their employees and the emancipation of workers can only be achieved to the detriment of employers. At the international level, some countries have the capacity to organize work in such a way that everyone benefits, while others do not. France is one of a small group of industrialized countries that has failed to develop this capacity

The historical causes of paternalism: 

The Le Chapelier Act of 14 June 1791

The author states that the historical source of this mistrust goes back to the Revolution and to the Le Chapelier Act of 14 June 1791 which prohibits corporations, journeymen and workers’ coalitions.

It was not until the Waldeck Rousseau Act of 21 March 1884 to legalize trade unions and the Act of 1 July 1901 that the articles dealing with the offense of association were repealed from the Criminal Code and freedom of association was affirmed.

In Germany and in the northern countries, the history has been different and these countries have found agreements, compromises between employers and employees so that the organization of social relations can be established.

The history of French unionism is particularly difficult, consisting solely of virulent challenges to the power of employers.

In this French context, the history of unionism is particularly difficult, consisting solely of virulent challenges to the power of employers. The French state has not supported the employees and has been hostile to the development of trade unions. The rate of unionization in France has always remained very low: it was 1.9% in 1910 and 8.1% in 2001, the lowest in Europe. Spain, second last, had a unionization rate in 2001 of 16.1%. For the author, the unionization rate of 1910 shows that the countries plagued by trade union underdevelopment before the First World War seem to be the ones with poor social relations today. Among the countries of Europe, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Austria have facilitated the development of professional organizations and now have cooperative relations between employees and employers. Similarly, the Scandinavian countries now have the largest unionization rates in the world, and they are among the countries with the best labor relations and a standard of living well above that of French workers. 

The pros and cons of family businesses and paternalism.

The paternalistic approach of improving working conditions, housing, and health soon reduced social conflict

All industrial countries were plagued by social misery, strikes and labor disputes until the First World War. While repression was the first response from employers, soon employers realized that it was better to use more peaceful relations and establish a paternalistic leadership style.

This paternalistic approach, which consisted in improving working conditions, housing and health, quickly eased social conflicts.

The author explains that the paternalist was born in the United States. Family capitalism was quickly confronted with the growth of companies and family leaders had to surround themselves very quickly with professional managers with whom they shared their power. In Germany and France, large industrial families are also building homes, businesses, schools, and medical centers for their employees. Pension and occupational accident insurance systems are being put in place.

Family and patriarchal authority are therefore at the heart of the paternalistic approach.

The company is presented as a family whose boss is the father. She takes care of the family of the worker whose paternal authority is used to get her children to start working in the factory. Above all, it is a matter of establishing the boss’s authority, securing the workers’ buy-in and discouraging activism. This is the good thing about paternalism: avoiding social conflict and maintaining a sense of social peace. 

Thus, the paternalistic strategy of managing labor disputes seemed to have been universal toward the end of the nineteenth century. Yet it has evolved differently in subsequent countries. Indeed, from the beginning of the 20th century, the management of large German and American companies became more professional.

In England, and especially in France, management is mostly family oriented and economic performance is affected.

When management is predominantly family based, economic performance suffers.

The American historian Chandler sees a direct link between the British and French family of capitalism and family management, which deprives firms of the capabilities needed to exploit the economies of scale characteristic of the new industries of the time.

On the contrary, “in Germany and the United States, entrepreneurs made the investments in infrastructure and personnel needed to exploit the returns to scale. Entrepreneurs soon shared the management of the companies with the managers they had recruited themselves.”.

France’s Decline

The bankruptcies of the French management do not go unnoticed and fuel the resentments of the workers. Workers’ delegates at the Exhibitions watch, aghast, the prodigious German and American development and they question the mismanagement of French capitalism. Michelle Lamont notes that “the fascination of power has often been related to the structure of traditional French enterprise, with its centralized authority, its fine divisions between the layers and units that operate, and its conservative and careful management down to the lowest level.”

On the eve of World War II, the French economic system was also in crisis again, and there was talk of France’s decline once again.

The similarities between paternalism and bureaucracy

After 1945, it was the bureaucratic phenomenon, to use Michel Crozier’s expression, that best defined the management of large companies. There are similarities between paternalism and bureaucracy.

Bureaucratic phenomena have played a decisive role in the continuation of poor labor relations in France. Family capitalism and bureaucratic capitalism are two modes of organization which, each in their own way, provide a response to the fundamental problem of authority and cooperation in labor relations.

In the family and paternalistic model, functional authority identifies with patriarchal authority that gives it legitimacy. In the bureaucratic model, authority is converted as much as possible into an impersonal rule, and the very structures of the organization seem to be organized in such a way that a sufficient distance can be established between the people who have to make decisions and those who are affected by those decisions.

Bureaucratic organization solves the problems created by French mistrust of direct authority relations, “since the existence of impersonal rules and centralization makes it possible both to maintain an absolutist conception of authority and to eliminate all direct dependency relations.”

France’s Contradictions in Authority

According to Michel Crozier, “the bureaucratic system of organization is the best possible solution to the contradictions that the French suffer in terms of authority.”

Family capitalism is also a solution to these contradictions, a solution that is in some ways more flexible and effective, but which can also become a blocking factor.

In Germany and the United States, countries where trust between managers and employees is rather good, the organization of the company is chosen according to economic criteria. In France and Italy, the organization of the company is chosen to protect individuals from each other. This requires careful definition of tasks and statuses, so that each can escape the other’s arbitrariness.

The Non-Renewal of France’s Managerial Elites

In terms of the disadvantages of paternalism, the French bureaucratic organization is not conducive to the renewal of managerial elites because the role of the leader is severely limited.

The bureaucracy effectively prohibits the development of internal promotion.

In the bureaucratic organization, the leader does not hire staff, he cannot fire them, he cannot promote his subordinates or even contribute significantly to their promotion. This prohibits the development of internal promotion.

French capitalism is characterized by a strong circulation of the elites of the state towards the companies is a weakness of the internal management promotion. The lack of renewal of managerial elites reinforces the logic of “us” against “others.”

Because managers have only limited experience in the lower echelons of a company, they are relatively distrustful and less likely to delegate authority to their subordinates.

France is at the bottom of the pack in terms of delegation of authority

At the level of the delegation of authority, France is at the bottom of the pack, along with Portugal, Greece and Italy.

The main cause of dissatisfaction is the lack of freedom of decision

When we analyze data on workplace development from the point of view of employees, we realize that the main cause of dissatisfaction is the lack of freedom of decision. The situation is not changing much because we are in a vicious circle. When there is such great distrust between the superiors and the employees, the promotion is liable to be accused of favoritism, a major sin in this system.

 Far from remedying the structural weakness of internal promotion, the State has instead aggravated the situation and reinforced an existing shortcoming.

The increase in state parachuting is accompanied by an increase in the share of enarches among the big bosses. In 1993, 47% of the large French bosses had a career in the public service, 21% in companies, 24% were heirs, 27% were Polytechnicians and 23% were enarchs (11% in 1985).

The number of employers with a career in the company is very low in France.

The figure of 21% for employers with a career in the company is very low. In Germany, it is 66% and 51% in the United Kingdom.

Public sector bosses are on average a little older, but mostly have less seniority in the company they run and less work experience in general.

100% of the employers of foreign subsidiaries located in France are recruited by internal promotion. The criteria for choosing directors are not the same in French and foreign companies. Economists Francis Kramaz and David Thesmar have shown that 12% of companies listed in Paris are run by former cabinet ministers. Moreover, as these companies are on average very large, they account for 65% of market capitalization. 

The consequences of paternalism:

France is in the midst of a vicious cycle.

Against this background, France is in the midst of a vicious cycle. What makes a vicious circle so unique is that only one element fits in so that the others follow suit and follow suit.

The radicalization of trade unions has made cooperation and the delegation of authority within companies difficult, but the preference of French management for rigid hierarchies and prestigious statuses has certainly tarnished the image of leaders and contribute to the weakness of managerial capitalism.

As the actions of the state have only reinforced these existing shortcomings, everyone can see that France has enough to close several vicious circles.

Are there traces of a particular conception of freedom which, according to Philippe d’Iribarne, insists on nobility, honor and status?

N.d.l.r: this perceived value of freedom is linked to the traditional source of power, it is in cognitive dissonance with the value of rational freedom desired by the revolutionaries of 1790 who followed the ideas of the Enlightenment. 

This disagreement over the reading of the word “freedom” summarizes in itself the depth of the gap between managers and employees.

This disagreement over the reading of the word “freedom” sums up in itself the depth of the gap that separates the leaders from the employees, the minority in power from the rest of the citizens and for more than a century, the compulsory philosophy courses in high school have not changed anything: each side remains inflexible in its reading of the values of the republic and it is certain that there are teachers to give good grades to the best students of each of the readings of the value freedom, out of respect for academic conformism and probably out of bureaucratic respect for the value of freedom itself, without making any societal choices, without any learning of civic responsibility. 

Family capitalism seems to act as a kind of refuge from the rejection of liberalism.

Economically, the bureaucratic model has fallen into disuse, at least in the private sector, and the state is gradually disengaging from the organization of the economy. Family capitalism, by contrast, is in good shape and seems to be taking the place of sanctuary from the rejection of liberalism.

There are two distinct approaches to family capitalism.

The first refers to control of ownership, where a family owns a significant share of the voting rights associated with a company’s shares.

The second refers to the management of companies, when the company is run by a member of the founder’s family.

There is an important difference between the two: conditions are worse when an heir is in charge, and less bad when a professional rules alongside the family. 

the welfare state took the place of private employers to expand social benefits and insurance.

The paternalistic strategy allowed family businesses to gain a comparative advantage in resolving 19th century social conflicts by focusing on employee well-being, it set back unionism and reduced labor disputes.

To a large extent, the welfare state has taken over from private employers to pay for health insurance, pension funds, and to build schools and hospitals.

When looking at the links between family capitalism and social relations within firms at the industrial level and between countries, it can be shown that there are indeed more family firms in countries where social relations are hostile.

Likewise, in enterprises and industries where the share of work is highest, there are more family enterprises.

This is the case in France and there are many more family businesses in industries where the labor factor is greater, in the distribution sector and they are less present in industries where the capital factor is predominant, such as heavy industries.

Family businesses offer their employees a form of insurance against the risk of job loss.

In terms of the labor market: family capitalism does not create any particular hostility on a firm scale. Social relations in France are as bad in public administrations and public companies as in private companies.

In fact, there are fewer conflicts in family businesses than in other businesses. The French economist David Thesmar has shown that family businesses in France insure their workers against the risk of losing their jobs. Family firms lay off fewer workers than others in the event of a downturn. In turn, employees accept lower wages, which explains, at least in part, the higher profit rates that we sometimes see in family businesses.

More generally, because the family is committed to the survival of the business, they tend to manage prudently, with low debt and less risk-taking. For workers already employed on permanent contracts in the company, this means a more stable future than elsewhere.

Family businesses are well suited to a hostile environment.

Family businesses therefore have a different approach to hiring and firing than other businesses. Family businesses are much more likely to discourage union representation. As a result, family businesses are well equipped to operate in a difficult social environment. They are well suited to a hostile environment.

The French case can thus be interpreted: social relations in France are exceptionally bad and companies are adapting as they can. Family capitalism would be the best system possible, given France’s specific characteristics. 

Human resources management is particularly archaic in companies where managers are heirs

At the level of communication and management: on the other hand, human resources management is particularly archaic in companies where managers are heirs.

These managerial deficiencies explain a significant part of the productivity differences between French and American companies.

Paternalistic practices limit the emancipation of workers, they freeze class relations within society and, from this point of view, they remain a determining factor in poor social relations in the long term. In particular, family capitalism risks reinforcing a deep-seated flaw in French capitalism: the lack of renewal of managerial elites.

Hereditary family capitalism poses another problem: wars of succession are common as soon as the number of heirs becomes too large, and choosing an heir to run his business at the expense of another, more qualified person exposes his distrust of the rest of society by favoring family relations. This strategic choice has an impact on economic performance and management.

Countries where management is chosen on purely professional criteria are countries where authority is delegated within companies, and countries that favor family management are those where authority remains centralized.

The Anglo-Saxon countries and the countries of northern Europe are characterized by professional management and strong accountability at the middle levels. The Mediterranean countries retain family management and centralized hierarchical relations.

To work as a team, it is better to go to subsidiaries of foreign companies

Michelle Lamont notes that Americans place more emphasis on teamwork than the French: “in the American working world, conviviality is the key to integration: helping employees, whoever they are, to feel comfortable appears as a crucial task.” Moreover, “to the extent that predictability of behavior is essential to the operation of large organizations, managers take care to avoid conflicts as much as possible”.

It is perhaps this corporate culture that explains the success of American companies among French employees. Among the companies where it is good to work in France, there are few French companies: 5 out of 20 while there are 12 American companies in the top 20. Workers prefer to work in companies from countries where management is professional and where there is a greater delegation of authority.

We can therefore speak of a comparative advantage of certain countries in terms of quality of management. These countries are more likely to create powerful organizations where everyone’s work is valued. In France, too often, “executives know that they will never reach the top: most fall asleep, and a few, the most enterprising, leave.”

Nd.l.r: The luckiest go to the French subsidiaries of foreign companies but they condemn themselves in principle to no longer be able to return to a family business, especially if it is run by an heir and the recruitment firms do not forget to tell these candidates: their files frighten paternalistic bosses because they know too much about how to better run a company. Personally, we were treated to this terse and definitive remark at P.A. Consulting Group, a company with which we have been in close collaboration for several years through the use of the P.A.P.I. recruitment test. Hence our desire on fileane.com to leave the systems of power to develop our networks of citizens of Life.

Conservatism and rigid hierarchies are powerful impediments to growth

On the growth front, conservatism and rigid hierarchies are powerful impediments to growth, especially when firms must adopt new technologies.

France lacks innovative SMEs

This is particularly clear in SMEs. It is well known that France lacks innovative SMEs: “France has a deficit of medium-sized enterprises, with 50 to 500 employees, resulting in an insufficient number of French mini-groups with 500 to 3000 employees.”

Small and medium-size business owners complain that large companies are reluctant to buy new products. Why? One reason that is often cited is that Mr. Dupont, as an individual buyer, is willing to take risks and buy new products, but that same Mr. Dupont, as an executive in a large group, is primarily concerned with not taking risks. This is typical of rigid hierarchies: it limits individual risk-taking and initiative.

Here we find the fundamental distinction between individual attitudes and collective performance: a company is not the sum of its individuals. A poorly run enterprise can turn open, enterprising individuals into petty, fearful bureaucrats. The negative effects of the lack of individual initiatives are therefore not limited to the large groups themselves, but spill over into the economy as a whole.

There are many indirect consequences of paternalism, the first of which is unemployment.

From a social point of view: the immediate consequence of bad social relations in the enterprise is of course to make workers unsatisfied. The story does not stop there: there are a whole series of indirect consequences, the first of which is unemployment.

Unemployment rates have risen most in countries with conflicting social relations compared with countries where historically they are normally cooperative.

Distrust between managers and employees creates an additional cost.

Distrust between managers and employees creates extra costs, like a tax or a severance grant, but no one pays them.

This additional cost depresses the demand for labor from enterprises and reduces employment.

Today, adaptability and anticipation have become the key to the success of organizations.

The Third Industrial Revolution makes corporate cooperation more crucial than ever.

The old way of organizing was relatively inintensive in human relations, while the new one is much more so. The Third Industrial Revolution is characterized by the increased importance of human capital, and it makes corporate cooperation more crucial than ever.

When comparing job satisfaction between northern European countries with a tradition of cooperation and France, for example, the top 30% of French seem to be less satisfied with their work than the bottom 30% of Swedes.

The gap in job satisfaction between the two groups of countries widens sharply when one moves down the pay scale.

To sum up, the consequences for the labor market of the lack of cooperation within companies are: more unemployment, fewer jobs, less well-being for those who are employed, and the negative effects on the least skilled workers are multiplied.

An estimate of the overall economic cost of our inability to create productive labor relations organizations.

We can finally estimate the overall economic cost of our inability to create productive labor relations organizations.

Countries with constructive industrial relations are on average richer than others. This surplus wealth is due in part to an increase in the employment rate and in part to efficiency gains at the enterprise level.

Improving cooperation within companies can be measured by several percentage points of GDP 

The solutions presented by the author:

The French do not have confidence in their business leader and, as far as can be judged, the trend is not improving. According to SOFRES, in 1985, only 25% of French people expressed distrust of employers; in 2005, 55% expressed distrust of employers.

These relations of mistrust have persisted for so long that there is reasonable doubt as to the ability of companies to improve the situation on their own. The solutions that the author identifies are: to promote the transfer of SMEs.

Fostering the transfer of SMEs

Today, it is much easier and cheaper to send a business directly online. Transmission should be facilitated for managers and professionals.

Financing SME growth

A second solution is to finance the growth of SMEs.

The development of corporate governance and effective checks and balances, particularly in the press and the media.

As regards the renewal of the social dialog, there are many proposals.

The challenge is to build trust and constructive working relationships within companies. This raises the question of the place of trade unions.

The State can promote a positive development in social dialog, but it must first sweep its doors and change the status of the civil service. Successful reforms seem to share some features, including the establishment of a simple and clear structure, with a limited number of levels possessing decision-making power.

It also requires the development of corporate governance and effective checks and balances, particularly in the press and media.

Education and training.

Finally, the author concludes on education and training. He quotes Michel Crozier as saying, “The education system of a society reflects the social system of that society and is, at the same time, the essential means by which that system is perpetuated.”

Hierarchical relationships, centralized decision-making, and the difficulty of working as a group are found in schools and universities. School is indeed the model we refer to in our adult life.

Learning to work in groups and participate in the life of an organization should be done at an early age. Because group work is the most important work in today’s professional world, it should be in schools, middle schools, and high schools as well.

The author concludes that the French will not be put back to work for a long time without making the work more satisfactory for everyone.

Rebuilding human relations in business is the challenge of our generation, if we want to combat the devastation of unemployment and underemployment, precariousness, lack of growth, and if we want to be competitive in the game of world trade. 

Our comments: 

We have repeatedly criticized on our website fileane.com the mindset of leaders who use relational networks to govern in our power systems while refusing to consider that their systems are exhausted and that they need to discuss the networked alternative again.

We have also shown the cultural dimension of the inadequacies of our societies to meet our reasons for living. This book thus illuminates the question of the paternalistic leadership style that remains very present in France.

As the author points out, the fundamental problem is the lack of leadership renewal and the strong presence of heirs at the helm of companies. This situation stems from a lack of growth in family businesses in the 1900s, especially at a time when these businesses were expanding in other industrialized countries.

The description of the situation is perfectly consistent. This is one of the first times that this questioning of the functioning of our economic and social system uses statistical methods and takes on such a rational and logical aspect.

From this point of view, we are very pleased to see in this way that our points of view are supported by studies, analyzes that are unparalleled from a rational and scientific point of view (even if our remarks seem just as rational to us). We have often taken as an example the management of German companies and we have indicated that most of these companies are run by the best executives. This book provides figures that support this analysis. 

Yet this book elicits constructive remarks or criticism from us.

Firstly, in terms of historical causes: the starting point indicated by the author is correct but incomplete.

On our website, about the revolution of 1789, we showed the mistake made: the obligation to legitimize the revolutionary power through Rousseau’s ideas led to the suppression of the intermediary bodies between the state and the citizens.

What the revolutionaries failed to see was that, by abolishing collective ownership, they were setting the stage for the abusive development of individual ownership, especially among owners of industrial inputs.

But the origin of the malaise is much older for us. The difference that the author highlights between the countries of the North and the countries of the South of Europe, lies in the fact that the history of these countries is different: in France the network organization of the time of the cathedrals was destroyed by an absolute monarchy while in Italy the power of the Pope hindered the rise of a centralized power; in the countries of the North, the network organization of the time of the cathedrals was maintained more through the Knights Teutonic, the commercial organization of the Hanse.

This tradition of cooperation has been taken up by the Protestant movement, the mutual societies often led by pastors to help the peasants. It is then normal to find it in the rate of unionization, in the habit of putting professionals at the head of companies, in the development of apprenticeships led by the elders, the fact that the company commits itself to recruit these apprentices and allows them for the best to arrive at the executive level.

There is indeed a culture here that has been banned in France and that the counter-powers have not managed or wanted to restore.

This rip for more than 700 years has not closed, we have kept traces of it through cathedrals, destroyed abbeys restored or surviving, charters of free cities. We have shown the role of Joan of Arc between 1429 and 1431 in the re-establishment of a network organization with free cities.

In Alsace, the network organization was destroyed when peasants rose up in 1525 to suppress the abuses of the feudal system that was restored after 1307 and the suppression of the order of the Temple and the sidelining of the knighthood for the benefit of the royal troops. These peasants and bourgeois of cities that support the values of Protestantism were crushed by the army of the Duke of Lorraine on behalf of the King of France. The locations of the two defeats are known: on May 16 and 17, 1525, the Duke of Lorraine’s troops killed about 20,000 people in Lupstein, Saverne and Neuwiller. On May 20, the Battle of Scherwiller killed more than 4,000 peasants.

These issues then became the focus of the religious wars between 1562 and 1598, and at the European level, the Thirty Years’ War between 1618 and 1648.

The preserved memory of the plundering of the wealth managed by the common property at the time of the cathedrals and the flourishing medieval period.

For seven centuries, people remembered the theft and plunder of wealth managed jointly by monastic and knighthood orders, and repeatedly called for the restoration of some form of common ownership to their social groups.

We have also shown how the nobility has recovered this wealth, which culminates in 1790 in the sale of the clergy’s property in the form of national property. Napoleon’s empire did not settle this question.

A strong new signal to show that the domination of the aristocrats did not intend to cooperate with the working-class world, was the successive massacres of the canuts of Lyon in the 1830s. We showed what the nineteenth-century workers’ slogan meant: “price or death.” For us, the origins of this rift are clear and unambiguous: it bears the responsibility of the kings of France associated with the papacy and the most fundamentalist Catholicism.

Summarizing these ancient roots, the author repeats de Tocqueville’s famous analysis: “The division of the classes was the crime of the old royalty, and later became its excuse; for when all that make up the rich and enlightened part of the nation can no longer get along and help each other in government, the administration of the country by itself is as impossible, and a master has to intervene.”

Of course, under the Old Regime, this ruler was the divine right of the king. Of course, the administrative principle of spreading disorder so that you can impose your own power better remains valid and is reflected in paternalism: a boss who rules is better than constant conflict and the absence of work.

The author is right to show that trade unionism in this context had a difficult childhood and could not develop. This explains its radical and fiercely opposed character to the boss and the ruling class from the bourgeoisie who took power in 1789 without cooperating with the rest of the population except to find soldiers and fight for their particular interests.

The author could, however, have mentioned the many books on the role of Protestants in the early industrialization of France, and, as we do, take the example of Mulhouse’s industrial society, which is at the origin of several French international societies that were not imbued with overbearing paternalism.

This story remains current and has important similarities: once the populations revolted against the return of the feudal system and the return of the arbitrariness of the nobles and the king after having experienced three centuries flourishing under network organizations, when the king of France was ruined.

Today the employees who have known the Thirty Glorious are desperate and angry at the discontinuation of the social elevator, the policies that crush the middle classes of taxes of all kinds, the triumph of the sons-to-daddy and the development of corporatism and the occult networks of influence that establish new privileges and prohibit the social promotion of others, especially their children, champions of Europe of youth unemployment.

They refuse to accept that paternalistic family businesses are their only recourse in the face of the damage done by liberalism and globalization. Accepting this observation means erasing the social achievements of the 20th century, denying the struggles of our parents, which is contrary to all family values.

Renouncing one’s family to promote the wealth of those of the bosses and the ruin of the country, it is no longer Crow mixed with Racine, still less Molière, these are ordinary dramas, suicides at work that consume a society until the heat becomes flame and the fire a blaze that is extinguished in blood… as in time.

But it is possible today, in light of the past, to prepare for a future with peaceful but rapid and efficient transitions: to succeed in the velvet revolution that the French have never known how to live, to find new networked organizations.

The author underestimates the negative cost of paternalism in France and confrontational social relations.

The second criticism we make concerns the global assessment of the negative cost of paternalism in France and of conflictual social relations over the past century.

On our website we used the survey conducted in Germany in 1996 and which had been reproduced in several French journals. We said that, in the light of this survey, the cost of demotivation at work in France was at least around 400 billion Francs per year, a sum that is obviously lacking in GDP.

The author is right to add to this additional cost of demotivation some of the cost of unemployment, the cost of poor industrial relations and labor disputes, and the cost of strategic mistakes by incompetent leaders.

In Part 1 we have shown the institutions of the Life Networks, the functioning of the life project teams and the total quality approach which also makes it possible to calculate the Cost of Obtaining Solidarity through the use of the political principle of subsidiarity. These assessments of budgets to achieve total quality and solidarity are brought together in the Plan which in turn serves as the basis for the use of the Mint Full, without debts. We go much further than what Thomas Philippon said.

And we also take back the terrible mistakes of the French management, especially that of the companies in which we have worked for a few years.

For example, the estimated cost of the error made by the Chairman of Thomson Multimedia, who refused to invest in flat screen technology, while the patents were brought to him by RCA purchased in 1988 and were used immediately for the control rooms of SNLEs (nuclear missile-launching submarines) and the engineers of the Office of the Atomic Energy Commissioner are asking for the use of these patents to equip nuclear power stations and research centers with flat screens.

The refusal to invest by Thomson’s Chairman will be to the delight of Samsung and the Koreans and the Chinese company that has since taken control of Thomson Multimédia.

The author speaks of several points of GDP, he does not dare to say what the French employees have understood for a long time:

the poor management and shortcomings of human resources management in our country have ruined our social funds because of excessive unemployment over more than 30 years,

because of an automation of our means of production which has not been efficient because vocational training has remained insufficient

and for other reasons discussed in the book, including the furious desire of workers over 50 to leave a world of work in which, as they age, they are forced to see that they have been duped and abused by the centuries-old culture of contempt and self-sufficiency displayed by the ruling elites, simply because they were not born on the right side of the social divide.

Hence, the measures taken on social protection and pensions are perceived as particularly unfair and unfounded, even if reforms are needed to accompany social and demographic changes.

Instead of heirs, enarchs, politicians, and civil-service leaders, the country needs the human-resource-management and participatory-management skills to rise to the challenge that it refused before 1914, before 1940, and after 1945, and still refuses to accept today.

To estimate the overall cost of our poor social relations, we can draw the following table in billions of euros per year:

overall cost of poor social relations 

GDP 2006 in billion euro per year	1,792
For the record: 2% of GDP =	35,84
3% of GDP =	53.76
Evaluation of the cost of fear in French companies on the basis of the 1996 survey in Germany ( 400 billion francs/year ): internal resignation, absenteeism, turn over, alcohol, medication, psychological harassment…	61
Additional cost of poor social relations on the economy, unemployment, lack of growth, loss of investment and markets: 2% of GDP ( minimalist estimate ).	36
total:	97
Assessing Tax Evasion to Tax Havens	50
that is a total shortfall of 147 to 150 billion euros per year, which represents the cost of non-quality of our French system of power.	150
Comparison with social deficits and budgets for environment and research
Health insurance deficit, forecast 2007	12
General pension deficit, forecast 2007	5
For the civil service pension scheme, there is no pension fund as pensions are paid by the annual finance laws and the local government pension fund (CNRACL) is currently in surplus (EUR 2.7 billion in 2000). It thus finances part of the deficit of other less favored schemes such as those of the SNCF, miners or craftsmen.
Current environmental expenditure: 2% of GDP	35.84
Research expenditure: budget set at 2.5% of GDP is higher than currently	44.8
total	97.64
remains available for growth investments compared to the total of 150 billion euros of non-quality cost of our power system	50
state aid for enterprises, exemptions from charges, etc. in 2010 a number of these tax-niche subsidies can be phased out, which further helps public finances if the investment is not there	65

These figures give us an order of magnitude; these are minimum estimates.

Taking into account the deterioration in confidence between 1985 and 2005 ( increase of 25 to 55% in employees’ distrust of their employers, SOFRES survey ), the figures from the 1996 German survey can be transposed to France with a higher increase than we estimated.

Waves of suicides at work since 2005 support a larger estimate.

It is clear that the productivity potential of abandoning paternalistic leadership and developing participatory leadership is enormous and is sufficient in itself to fill our social deficits..

If we add in the EUR 50 billion per year of tax evasion to tax havens, the situation becomes damning for our leaders and revolting for citizens.

In the 1980s, the total quality movement managed to reduce the 2/3 of non-quality in production (around 200 billion francs/year). This approach has been supported by the network of quality circles which have practiced problem-solving methods according to the principle of subsidiarity. The starting point of this approach was the humble but serious observation that according to the 80/20 rule, 80% of the problems came from the direction and management, mainly autocratic and paternalistic leadership styles, which resulted in the establishment of flatter and less numerous hierarchical lines and the development of the participatory leadership style.

But this approach to developing the quality of our social relations and the management of our human resources has as its starting point the abandonment and elimination of the age-old taboos and a major cultural revolution in the functioning of both enterprises and the state. By eliminating these dysfunctions and changing attitudes and management style, we can even finance current spending on research and environmental protection. . . 

This is all the more true if we add the savings achieved by returning to full employment, keeping older people in work until they reach retirement age and employing young people between 20 and 30.

If we add a tax on robots, we understand that our welfare states will immediately become surplus, which provides cushioning provisions for the demographic shock. All this while remaining within the framework of our system of power and our social institutions.

This approach to developing the quality of our social relations and the management of our human resources is based on the abandonment and elimination of the age-old taboos and a major cultural revolution in the functioning of both enterprises and the state. By eliminating these dysfunctions and changing attitudes and management style, we can even finance current spending on research and environmental protection. . . We have shown that social peace in the Networks of Life develops without the presence and intervention of the structure of the state. The path is clear to leave power systems.

We are not short of wealth, but we waste much more than other countries our capacity to develop because of outdated and unfair management.

Since 2003, we insist that we do not lack wealth but that we waste much more than other countries our capacities to develop because of an obsolete and unfair management that finds its continuation in the high level of tax evasion… and the scandal of our republic that manages to stifle the abundant use of utopias and myths of all kinds to make the public believe that this republic and this neo-liberal system of power still have legitimacy. 

The direct consequence of this is that it involves a different kind of social policy than has been pursued by previous governments.

• It is one thing to want to privatize social security, and it is enough to say so openly to take responsibility for this outbreak of hostilities
• but draft laws to force employees to pay for the mistakes and selfish interests of ruling families and republican elites,
• asking employees to work more,
• drivers to pay several hundred million fines for minor infringements, most often of speed rules,
• all of this, in order to close the public deficits, the main cause of which is tax evasion by the most powerful companies and the richest citizens, represents for the state a flagrant complicity likely to legitimize a new revolution.
• Allowing this situation to be camouflaged under tax shield measures that do not correspond to the reality of tax evasion by companies located in France is an act of serious complicity. The employee who works with companies and managers who take away income without any measure should not be confused with paid work and without any ethical or moral justification.

We advise activists to reverse the gains made by the Resistance and Social Security forces, instead of privatizing and giving financial institutions outrageous rents, to use the example of US pension funds.

The example of mutual societies and cooperatives or pension funds.

Yes, they use the stock exchange to increase their stock portfolios, but initially they are mutuals: the president is elected by the members and the mutuals of American civil servants for the moment buy the shares of our French companies to the point that the employees of the companies of the CAC 40 also work to pay the pensions of the American civil servants before paying with their taxes, the retirement of the French civil servants and then theirs.

It is clear that this is detrimental to the growth of the purchasing power of French employees. When we take the well-known example in France of Calpers, the pension fund of the civil servants of California, we see today that this spirit of mutualism defends ethical values and it forced the GlaxoSmithKline laboratory to lower the price of its anti-AIDS treatment in Africa; General Electric had to change the rules of allocation of stock options; Calpers asked Tycho to leave the tax haven of Bermuda; Rank Xerox was placed at the top of the least ethical companies by Calpers in 2003 ( source: L’Express, 15 May 2003 ). We are not going to continue this new conflict between pension funds with mutual and ethical values, and much more aggressive and speculative investment funds.

Choosing sides is not difficult for those who want the good of all.

The rise of the networked organizations that we are preparing on our website fileane.com is incorporating this sea change in the attitude of our leaders.

The solutions presented by the author are suitable for us in the first place because they are geared towards more direct participation in organizations. But they must be immediately taken up by political and social actors.

On our website, we regularly write that we do not understand the passivity, the silence of both left-wing parties and trade unions on the issue of the right to vote of employee representatives on the board of directors or the supervisory board, except for the works council. This guilty silence reinforces employees’ distrust of their representatives. If our leaders, including trade unions, do not want to make this demand and participate in the change of management in companies and administrations, they should say so openly and resign.

There are so many employees, as the author writes, who have realized that they would never reach the top of their company despite their skills, that it is up to them to put this claim on the bargaining table.

On this site, we are not their spokesperson, of course, but several members of our team, among the most enterprising, refused to enter into family businesses and left this typically French world of scandalously outdated and ruinous paternalistic management.

Let us hope, for example, that the concessions which will manage the production of motor cars powered by compressed air from 2009 onwards will not be run in a paternalistic manner.

Similarly, let us hope that the bureaucratic administration will accept the risk of paying the bonus premium for these cars which do not emit CO2 by running on compressed air. Announced at a basic price of EUR 3 500, this premium of up to EUR 5 000 will enable consumers to buy these cars at zero cost. This prospect of settling urban transport pollution quickly gives an impetus for optimism and makes speculation about the rise in the price of a barrel of oil less unbearable.

However, we must remain vigilant so that this major progress is not hijacked and stopped by the oil and financial pressure groups. To finance the rapid development of production concessions, no need to call on commercial banks, at 3,500 euros per car, a tontine is enough in the context of a mutual or a production cooperative. If, on top of that, these concessions can be free, tax-free, we are not dreaming, we are only putting two feet into updating the time of cathedrals and developing new networked organizations.

We live in a time of possibility, all the more reason to get rid of the taboos and shackles of the most sordid past. 

The abandonment of paternalism in our work organizations must be an immediate and imperative national priority.

We call for the abandonment of paternalism in our work organizations to be made an immediate and imperative national priority before any challenges are made to social progress and social negotiations.

This book demonstrates once again this imperative need to change management in our country, it is useless to wait for the next one!

The author did not attempt to establish a causal link between paternalism and the abhorrent habit of French managers to employ only employees between the ages of 30 and 40. The link is to risk-aversion, the kind of thing the author talked about. Moreover, one undeniable fact should be added: older workers, with their skills, are no longer as prone as novices to submit to the questionable authority of a paternalistic leader: they frighten managers before scaring economists of the shameless cost to the collective due to their forced inactivity.

For our part, we will continue to publish our texts on education and training reform to show how networked organizations provide these stages of human resources and skills development.

What the author writes will be reflected in our developments but will go much further. A simple reminder for our passive and sleepy citizens, subjected to fashionable conformity: in Germany and the Scandinavian countries, the retirement age may be higher than in France, this poses less problems because from 50 years of age employees who have become experts in their field and who are paid accordingly, most often become trainers in learning centers and institutes of higher education to pass on their skills to the next generation or they become the general management of their organizations.

They do not stand behind their machines in workshops or their desks, enduring depressing ambient paternalism with no possibility of internal promotion, and finding on their holidays that their neighbors in Holland, as far away as Sweden and Finland (not to mention the newly rich Russians, but this is a special case!), have a much better standard of living than they do (though not necessarily in terms of culture and politeness). These meetings replace the visits to the Exhibitions made before 1914 or 1940 to which the author refers.

In these countries, executives and technicians do not need to compete for university professors or accept precariousness and disdain for temporary status to pass on their knowledge to students. Their salaries are mostly paid by their companies which finance these research and training institutes. The same is true, and it is still as damning for France.

Last criticism but not for the author because we know a little about the habits of the publishing houses and their caution not only paternalistic but also slavish towards the unique thinking of the French Franco elites (who are necessarily the first commercial target of these publishers but who also come to read our web pages…): the publisher could still have asked the author to indicate when, in what period, he sees the end of paternalism in France after more than a century of incitement to bad social relations and at least seven centuries of enrichment without serious cause and citizen.

French involvement in the voluntary sector

The domination of paternalism in our culture with its perennial bad social relations also provokes a revenge: deprived by the rogue law Le Chapelier from 1790 until 1901 of the freedom of association (that is for 111 years) , the French have for decades been very involved in the associative world.

For a majority of citizens who are deprived of internal promotion in working life, success does not depend solely on money, power and social standing (see the Capital-CSA survey of August 2007). Many believe that we can thrive even more by serving a cause, small or large, that is useful to society.

In France, associations and non-profit organizations are particularly numerous and dynamic: more than a million. Half of the French have ever belonged to an association and each year, nearly a third of the French are involved in these organizations as donors, volunteers or employees. Which is a world record.

Many simply create social bonds in villages and neighborhoods, but some are leading global humanitarian efforts ( Médecins Sans Frontières ).

The problem arises from the fact that the government has banned the development of local exchange services (SELs), which limits the economic and social dimension of these organizations, which must remain voluntary organizations without being able to create jobs and wealth in the non-market economy in order to protect the interests of the leaders of the market economy and the growth of inequalities in the market economy.

The end of family SMEs through the purchase of Anglo-Saxon investment funds.

Another possible answer on the date of the end of paternalism is linked to the development of the takeover of French paternalistic enterprises by pension funds and especially in recent years by Anglo-Saxon investment funds. These funds raise money from banks, insurance companies, pension funds or billionaires to buy businesses and make money through the credit purchase of businesses.

Restructuring of these enterprises is often limited to the elimination of expenditure deemed unnecessary and the reduction of the wage bill and sometimes to technological investments which the former family owners had not made.

The famous L.B.O. (leverage but out) technique is a financially legal martingale that often turns into a social nightmare, and in France, the list is long of companies acquired by these investment funds that have lost most or all of their production and their jobs that have been relocated to neighboring countries in order to achieve economies of scale or to countries with low labor costs in order to increase profit margins.

When the investments take place in France, they can increase profits by more than 30% but the profits of the operation are reserved to the owners of the investment funds. Employees do not benefit from it. Only salaried managers receive millions of euros for the price of their collaboration and unfailing obedience.

Here we are still dealing with paternalism and investment funds perpetuate paternalism at least towards managers. Such managers may duplicate this paternalism toward blue collar workers, or, as in most cases, they may employ more autocratic methods that trigger new social conflicts. Shareholders confiscate all profits, and employees must submit to very restrictive fiscal and socially demoralizing policies.

The author makes it clear at the beginning of the book that the French want to work and are not upset with the value of work. They just want to be entitled to a fair share of the fruits of their labor. We tell them that in networked organizations, this equitable sharing works and gives rise to flourishing civilizations that live social relationships based on a high level of trust, love and peace.

Alongside the capitalization of shareholders’ rights in companies, we know how the capitalization of employees’ social rights works. Since 1850, paternalism has fiercely opposed such a measure, which radically denies any right to inherit a business to run it. We will fight for such measures to be put in place and without necessarily waiting for a new choice of civilization.

Likewise, since the 2008 financial crisis, which was still ongoing in 2022, we have learned to use a currency that is full, debt-free.

These political, economic and social measures are leading us straight to this new humanist civilization, far from the tyrannical drifts of the Anglo-Saxon financial oligarchy and its ultra-liberal thinking. 

the link between paternalism and bureaucracy and Société Générale’s financial loss scandal:

update of 31 january 2008

Last night at the 8 p.m. newspaper on France 2, we saw the CEO of Société Générale confess coolly that he did not know the trader, his employee, that he had never seen him.

We also know for a few days that this trader had not taken a holiday for at least two years and that he is apparently 31 years old.

Société Générale is a traditional public limited company with a board of directors. It is not a modern SA with a board of directors and a supervisory board. The weight of expert employees in the executive is necessarily lower because a single man heads the executive and not a group of four to five directors. We are in the old French tradition of management. The one that Thomas Philippon talks about in his book that we just presented.

Let’s come to human resources management, which is obviously typical of old France as well. Why is it that a CEO in a defense tower in 7 years does not take the elevator to go greeting at least once a year the team of employees that earns him the most profits or is able to make him lose billions (5 billion for the moment)?

It is shocking and revolting: bureaucracy and paternalism share a common element that can be explained by the common origin of this management attitude: the contempt or ignorance of the employees who make up a company.

This lack of respect is entirely unthinkable in foreign businesses, beginning with American and German ones.. 

Let’s take the example of this American chemical plant along the Rhine.

a medium size compared to the factories of Schweizerhalle in Basel or Ludwigshafen opposite Mannheim.

Vincente, our chairman of the board, came at least every 3 years from the States to shake hands with the staff and workers. He had nothing special to say, he bothered to come and talk, eat, drink, laugh and spend a day with us. If there was bad news, we already knew it and he did not come to make demagogic or paternalistic speeches about the sense of effort and duty to the firm.

In principle, we organized a small party with our local partners: for example, to celebrate the brand new fire truck that the company was giving as a gift to the nearest fire station. It was not a philanthropic donation or free of charge: everyone knew that this truck was reinforcing the capacity of local firefighters to respond to a major fire at the plant and that this truck was also intended to make local firefighters a little less jealous because the plant had trucks of this type and it was difficult to imagine that the nearby emergency centers could buy such equipment from public funds, especially in such a small village.

The metallurgy plant belonging to a German group

That’s just one example. Let’s take another example, in this metallurgical plant belonging to a well-known German group, the CEO would come to the plant every year and he would talk to everyone, he would receive the union representatives separately for an hour and everything would be put on the table, without the presence of the plant management. At the end of the day, we would meet management and members of the works committee around a table in our canteen for a snack with sausages, cheese, wine or beer and we would discuss the future of the company and the factory imagining all possible cases, the best and the worst with laughter and jokes and he often had ideas that we did not expect from him.

One year, he had noticed that this canteen was a pity to see. Around the table, he told us that next year he wanted to be received in a real company restaurant. We immediately hired the Alsacienne de Restauration and Marc, its dynamic CEO, made us this real company restaurant. It was simple and straightforward and our handshakes were warm, including of course those of the union stewards. It should be added, without forcing his modesty, that he belonged to a Protestant family driven out of France by Louis XIV who had started industrial and commercial affairs in the German Saar. As a result, he spoke a French without a German accent with an all-Protestant modesty and an ear for the people around him in stark contrast to the contempt for the French paternalistic leaders discussed in this book by Thomas Philippon.

Another example of social interaction is in the companies I have worked in.

At the level of PTO management,

in this chemical plant, each year in works councils we were peeling the balances of the leave not taken from the previous year: the purpose was simple.

It is a safety measure: in a refinery or a chemical plant classified Seveso, all must be in shape, attentive because the slightest human stupidity can turn into an explosion and in case this fire is not immediately extinguished, the plant jumps and there remain only ashes of personnel (and it is not certain that rescuers quickly know how many people these ashes correspond to).

In short, everyone had to take their 6 weeks of paid leave to ensure their physical and especially psychological health.

In the electronic arms company in Sophia Antipolis, we applied the same rule even though the establishment had almost no risk of exploding, the moray eel was not loaded with explosives.

A polytechnician, head of the research laboratory, had not taken 2 weeks of vacation in a row for many years (more than 5 in any case). Arrears of leave not taken exceeded 150,000 Francs at the beginning of the 1990s, the annual salary of a technician.

Union representatives were surprised that this issue was brought up. The director was embarrassed but it was the responsibility of the DRH and after negotiations, we made him a transfer of 70,000 Francs (our secretary at the signature of this letter had pointed out to us that it was the price of an already beautiful car) and he had to take at least two months of vacation at the end of his project (which was certainly not trivial: it was to develop the acoustic pulse compressor of the Topex-Poseidon satellite, a world first which made it possible to measure the height of the oceans to the nearest 2 cm around 1994 and to the nearest 2 mm Today; this has helped characterize the el Nino phenomenon and climate change mainly in the Pacific Ocean).

And we continued to apply this common sense rule, to the great relief of the accountant who did not know what to do with these arrears of paid leave.

To come back to Société Générale, when will the labor inspectorate send this bank a fine for non-compliance with labor law on paid leave?

In terms of recruitment

We recruited at Sophia-Antipolis, a trader in the early 1990s to manage the queues of military programs with Arab countries. These sums, which constituted advances before delivery of the equipment (had already been delivered for example the electronic belt of defense of Iraq against Iran: the project manager unemployed after the first Gulf war shared our meals waiting for a new position), were beginning to bring 20% of the profits of the group’s subsidiary, so much to take care of it properly!

The successful candidate was 29 years old and had been in the exchange rooms of London, Singapore and Hong Kong. He was worn out and realized it. His plan was to find a business close to Nice for a few years before opening a financial consultancy in Nice.

Compensation trading was as close as on the stock market. Begun at 500,000 francs, we reached an agreement around 380,000 in the early 1990s (we respect the 10-year criminal statute of limitations and we take examples of more than fifteen years). The employment contract was first referred by the School Management. After the guarantee provided by the DRH that this position did not fall within the classification of jobs carried out with the Hay method and that within 5 years at the latest this position would be eliminated after the departure of this young trader and the delivery of equipment to the Arab countries… and that no X Telecom should be jealous of this remuneration, the management kindly signed this contract whose salary was derisory compared to the tens of millions of francs that this young trader would bring us (we had already earned several million by letting this kitty lie dormant).

This recruitment was explained to the works council and staff. This expert in cash management on international financial markets was well received and quickly integrated in the world of other experts.

This young single man, with no sentimental attachment, in a smile, had admitted to us that he intended to catch up a certain time in this sentimental domain to find a balance of life; we had told him to beware nevertheless of certain creatures walking on the French Riviera!

In an American firm, the general staff does not entrust important responsibilities to a young manager without having seen and talked with his wife and possibly his children… and the woman has no interest in being neglected or abused, that is precisely what they want to see to know if this young manager enjoys a family balance that will help him recover from the intense pace of business life in which he will be immersed.

These may be basic and incomplete methods of human resources management, but at least they existed. They can be used as an example in a high school human resources management course or in higher education, that’s a starting point.

The case of Société Générale is the perfect counter-example of a lack of serious human resources management.

We repeat: the absence of HRM and the disdain or ignorance of employees is the hallmark of bureaucracy and paternalism. The owner is no longer in his castle but in his office with the door closed, he can have his own elevator so as not to meet his staff inadvertently, this is very often the case. A factory or a company on strike besieged by the French CRS must ask Angéla Merkel for help so that the French law is discarded and the German law is applied in French social relations, at least this is an intelligent answer at present in 2008… and unfortunately still valid in 2023. 

American Marshall Plan experts criticize French leadership management.

They can serve as a conclusion, because they are still relevant today.

In Thomas Phillipon’s book, le capitalism d’hetiers, la crisis française du travail, page 41, the author takes up the case after 1945 of the Marshall Plan during the reconstruction of the country (and we will not bring out this kind of French-French employers’ discourse as how it is the American bombers and the saboteurs and terrorists of the resistance who broke everything!).

The author cites the note by Luc Botanski

“American experts sent to France as part of the Marshall Plan focus their criticism on French business leaders and bosses. Recalling that the constructive attitude of the workers in the United States depends first and foremost on the constructive attitude of the management, they criticize, in particular, the French leaders for opposing any constructive change, […] for not leaving sufficient responsibility and authority to their subordinates… Generally speaking, the French are not “aware of the direct link between a high level of productivity and the application of sound methods of human relations”.

In 1986 before launching the first quality circles in the factory, during the management seminar, we applied the law of 20/80: 80% of the problems came from the management or were under its responsibility. As these problems had existed for a very long time, the Directorate had to agree to recognize this situation.

Our Director has said ‘yes’ clearly and strongly. After this humble and lucid acceptance that he could not solve our malfunctions alone, we were able to launch quality circles to accompany the development of programmable automata.

The following year we all received 2.3 months of gross salary in participation. This was simply a calculation of the 1958 Ordinance shareholding. The following year we received only half a month of participation because the American financiers of the Group had repatriated provisions to the States and Switzerland,

Hence the anger of our engineers against the group’s financiers. In the plant’s management committee, the head of Maintenance and New Works, who had been in charge of automating the five production sites, exclaimed “the bastards of American financiers.” I remembered this in 2006 and 2008, during the financial crisis, and still today.

Students, students and readers of our website are learning all this but apparently not our politicians and bureaucrats in our organizations.

In this major conflict and this choice of civilization, we must know who will win!

Autumn 2009: the number of suicides at work is still increasing in France,

the case of France Télécom is even worse than that of the Banks,

the election of the president’s son by his political friends to head a major public institution in the Paris region reinforces this sense of disgust: the leaders of our power systems can only exercise power through networks of influences and courtiers who are increasingly wieldy and abject in their submission to the manipulation and autocracy of their clan leaders.

They use their networks to govern but prohibit anything that allows the development of citizen networks, participatory and direct democracy, common ownership and complementary use of the two sources of knowledge.

It is no longer anachronism, but pure and hard despotism that citizens have the right to escape under article 2 of the 1789 declaration of human and citizen rights… even article 16 of the 1958 constitution does not resist this article. 

September 2012: Peugeot case,

from an article by Marianne: “PSA: after “the Sartorius expertise”, Hollande and Montebourg react ” Wednesday 12 September 2012 at 13:15 Mathias Destal – Marianne

But the document also highlights other shortcomings at the manufacturer. Rather than investing in new markets, such as Germany’s Volkswagen or its French rival Renault, PSA’s shareholders, led by the Peugeot family, preferred dividend payments and share buybacks, totaling almost EUR 6 billion between 1999 and 2011, he points out.

Sartorius also criticizes the builder for not having “previously conducted a general reflection on the future of its industrial sites, which would now leave more options to deal with its current situation of overcapacity”.

As for the choice that led it to decide to close Aulnay in 2014, the disavowal is unequivocal: the group made the mistake of evacuating too “quickly the possibility of shutting down its plant in Madrid, which nevertheless suffers from many flaws”, he judges. “History could probably have been written differently if PSA’s management had engaged in a transparent dialog with the social partners and the public authorities beforehand” 

…

Our question: how much more will this mischief of paternalism cost our country? 

Behind the management, we must not forget the masters of the world, the Anglo-Saxon financial oligarchy and its desire to establish a world government under its domination., We will come to this in Part 5, the transition to the Networks of Life.

Sources

• La logique du système capitaliste industriel
• Les Équipes de projets de vie
• De l’Assurance à la Solidarité
• La démarche Qualité Totale
• La Monnaie Pleine
• La Paix sociale
• Le travail dans les Réseaux de Vie