World War II management by bankers
Preparing for the Second World War
4.1 Bankers seek to stage the 1918 revenge and who to bet on.
Prepare for a new war between France, Germany and Russia.
1920: Despite the still warm ashes and the burning horror with which the World watches the massacre that has just ended, Wall Street already began to promote a policy of revenge in Central Europe and to prepare the advent of a new war between France, Germany and Russia.
The Council on Foreign Relations was created in New York (a US foreign ministry, independent of government control, owned by banks and industrial trusts). Paul Moritz Warburg is in charge. He remained an influential member until his death in 1932. He also founded the International Acceptance Bank of New York in 1921, which later merged with the Bank of Manhattan. He is also a founder, major shareholder and director of I.G. Farben USA, a sister company of the German I.G. Farben, headed by his brother Max Warburg. I.G. Farben and Vereinigte Stahlwerke together produced 95% of the explosives used by the Axis forces during the Second World War.
In the 1920s, Wall Street bankers in Central Europe sought out who to bet on to ensure a war as soon as possible. Paul Moritz Warburg went to Germany in 1929 and 1930 to represent the International Acceptance Bank, interested in financing and organizing Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist Party. He also represents the Guaranty Trust of J.P. Mogan in the same context.
Imbued with funds and support from all sides (Wall Street, the City of London, the Thyssen, the Schacht, the Krupp), Adolf Hitler and his S.A., armed with 400,000 machine guns by Rockefeller and J.P. Morgan, seized power after a disguised coup in January 1933.
According to documents disclosed by the Bank of England in 2012, Czechoslovak gold had been deposited in London in a sub-account in the name of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). When the Nazis entered Prague in March 1939, they immediately sent soldiers to the National Bank. The Czech administrators were ordered, on pain of death, to send two transfer requests. The first ordered the BIS to transfer 23.1 tons of gold from its Czechoslovak sub-account of the Bank of England to the Reichsbank sub-account, also held at Threadneedle Street. The second order instructed the Bank of England to transfer nearly 27 tons of gold held in its own name by the National Bank of Czechoslovakia to the BIS sub-account at the Bank of England.
The Second World War was the work of a global oligarchy
The war was not started by a rabid Führer who was running Germany at the time. The Second World War was the work of a global oligarchy, or more precisely Anglo-American plutocrats.
Using instruments such as the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, they began preparing for the next world war immediately after World War I. Their target was the USSR.
The Dawes and Young plans, the creation of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the suspension of the payment of reparations by Germany under the Treaty of Versailles and the acquiescence of Russia’s former allies in this decision, massive foreign investment in the economy of the Third Reich, the militarization of the German economy and violations of the Treaty of Versailles are all milestones on the road to war.
Behind the plot were key figures: the Rockefellers, the Morgan, Lord Montagu Norman (Governor of the Bank of England) and Hjalmar Schacht (President of the Reichsbank and Minister for Economy in Hitler’s government). The strategic agenda of the Rockefellers and the Morgan was to subjugate Europe economically, to saturate Germany with foreign investment and credit, and to get it to deliver a mortal blow to Soviet Russia, so that it would return to capitalism as a colony.
Montagu Norman (1871-1950) played an important intermediary role in the dialog between American financial circles and German business leaders. Hjalmar Schacht organized the reconstruction of the defense sector of the German economy. The plutocratic operation was concealed by politicians such as Franklin Roosevelt, Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill. In Germany, these projects were carried out by Hitler and Hjalmar Schacht. According to some historians, Hjalmar Schacht played a more important role than Hitler. But he remained in the shadows.
4.2 Financing the economic recovery of Germany after 1918.
After the First World War, the Dawes Plan aimed to compromise the Triple Entente and collect war reparations from Germany. The Dawes Plan (proposed by the Dawes Committee, chaired by Charles G. Dawes) was a 1924 attempt to address reparations, which had undermined international politics after World War I, and the Treaty of Versailles (France, reluctant, received more than 50% of the reparations).
Between 1924 and 1929, Germany received $2.5 billion from the United States and $1.5 billion from Britain under the Dawes Plan. This is a considerable amount, corresponding to $1 trillion (trillion) today.
Hjalmar Schacht played an active role in the implementation of the Dawes Plan. In 1929, he summarized the results by stating that in 5 years, Germany had received more foreign loans than the United States in the 40 years before the First World War. As a result, by 1929, Germany had become the world’s second largest industrial power, ahead of Britain.
4.3 The arrival of the Nazis in power.
On 30 January 1933, Hitler became Chancellor of Germany. Previously, American bankers had scrutinized his candidacy. Hjalmar Schacht traveled to the United States in the fall of 1930 to discuss the appointment with American colleagues. Hitler’s nomination was eventually approved at a secret meeting of financiers in the US.
Schacht spent all of 1932 convincing German bankers that Hitler was the best candidate for the job. He achieved his goal. In mid-November 1932, 17 of Germany’s top bankers and industrialists sent a letter to President Hindenburg demanding that he appoint Hitler as chancellor. The last working meeting of German financiers before the election was held on 4 January 1933 in Cologne, at the home of the banker Kurt von Schröder. Then the National Socialist Party came to power. Germany’s financial and economic relations with the Anglo-Saxons were further tightened.
Hitler immediately announced that he refused to pay war reparations. He questioned the ability of England and France to repay their own World War I debts to the United States. Washington did not object to Hitler’s announcement.
In May 1933, Hjalmar Schacht visited the United States again. He met with President Franklin Roosevelt and the major bankers to ask for a $1 billion line of credit. In June of the same year, Hjalmar Schacht traveled to London to meet with Montagu Norman. Everything went through like a letter to the post office. The British made a $2 billion loan. They raised no objection to Germany’s decision to suspend debt repayment.
According to some historians, the Americans and the British were accommodating because, by 1932, the Soviet Union had realized the five-year plan for economic development to reach new heights as an industrial power. A few thousand companies had been set up, particularly in heavy industry. The USSR’s dependence on imports of industrial products had thus diminished considerably. The chances of strangling the Soviet Union economically were nearly nil. It was then decided to resort to war and to launch the accelerated militarization of Germany.
For the latter, there was no problem in obtaining US credits. Hitler came to power in his country at about the same time as Franklin Roosevelt came to power in the United States. The bankers who backed Hitler in 1931 were precisely those who backed Roosevelt’s election. Once in office, the new president could do little less than give Germany generous credits. Indeed, many have noted the great similarity between Roosevelt’s New Deal and the economic policies of the Third Reich. No wonder. Indeed, the same governments were both rescuing and counseling the two governments. They represented mainly the US financial community.
Roosevelt’s New Deal quickly fell apart. In 1937, the United States was mired in economic crisis. In 1939, the US economy was running at 33% of its industrial capacity (19% at the height of the 1929-1933 crisis).
Rexford G. Tugwell, an economist with the First Brain Trust, a team of Columbia University scholars set up by Franklin Roosevelt and who contributed to the policy recommendations that led to Roosevelt’s New Deal, wrote that by 1939 the government had failed. The situation remained frozen until Hitler invaded Poland. Only the powerful winds of war could clear the mist. Whatever Roosevelt tried, his actions were doomed to failure. Only a world war could save US capitalism. In 1939, the plutocrats used every means at their disposal to pressure Hitler into launching a full-scale war in the East.
Hitler was not elected.
Hitler was not elected. In the parliamentary elections of late 1932 he lost more than a million votes. It was ruin and Hitler considered suicide… By contrast the communists had increased their scores and with social democracy they had the majority.
But social democracy under the pretext of fighting Hitler had had the old Marshal Hindenburg elected to the previous presidential elections. The latter with the agreement of the junkers, the conservative forces of the army and the barons of the Rhur worried about the failure of their protégé Hitler called him as Chancellor flanked by Von Papen who was supposed to monitor him…
Here are the exact figures for those who value Hitler’s victory:
in July 1932, in the legislative elections: Hitler had made 13,745,680 votes and a percentage of 37.3%
A few months after in November 1932 Hitler had 11,737,621 votes, which was a loss of 2 million votes and 4.2% of the percentage and he lost 34 seats, he had 196. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) won 20.4% of the vote, lost 1.2% and 12 seats, it had 7247,901 votes. The German Communist Party has 5,980. 239 votes, it gains almost 700,000 votes and 2.6% in percentage, it makes 16.9% and wins 2.6% and wins 11 seats, it has 100.
Losing 2 million votes in 5 months is a disappointment… And Hitler saw it as such… He was literally taken away by conservative forces and the barons of the arms industry in particular… As for the last elections, those of March 1933, when the Nazis were in power, they gave rise to a massive fraud recognized as such by all historians and Hitler did not even reach majority.
The NSDAP was never a majority party but was the first party in Germany in a very short time which was used by capital and conservative forces to install it in power because they were afraid of the constant progression of the communists and their fighting. The coup d’état followed with the banning of parties and trade unions…
Be interested in how capital imposes its authoritarian system… Even today, it will save you from rushing to the polls like turkeys…
Document: excerpts from the book by Jacques R. PAUWELS, Big Business with Hitler, Éditions Aden, February 2013.
On 6 November 1932, after yet another political crisis, new elections were called. But instead of winning a majority, as many Germans had hoped or feared, the NSDAP took a hard hit. …/… In his diary, Goebbels lamented: the party’s coffers were empty, the NSDAP was on the verge of disintegrating, he and other Nazi leaders were “gravely depressed” and Hitler was considering suicide.
A great fear struck the German establishment: would the asset that Hitler represented, and which had been shy about playing until then, slip from their hands forever? …/… American journalist Huber R. Knickerbocker, foreign correspondent for the international news service of American newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst, a great admirer of Hitler, wrote in the Vossiche Zeitung, a prestigious liberal-bourgeois newspaper:
“If Hitler does not come to power, his supporters among the people will leave his party in the lurch. They will unite with the Communists and the truly socialist elements within the SPD. They will thus form an irresistible force. They will overthrow capitalism [in Germany].”
…/… To prevent this scenario, Germany’s wealthiest and most powerful men needed to act fast. And so they did, essentially backstage.
Germany’s big business chose the “fascist option” at a precise moment in its history. This was the moment when industrialists and bankers decided that the establishment of a fascist dictatorship was the only way to prevent a communist victory in the elections and, at the same time, to ensure that the German state decided to solve the economic crisis in their own way, that is to say by a regressive social policy and an economic policy based on rearmament, in other words: for their benefit.
relations between American and Nazi financiers:
Document: extracts from the book by Jacques R. PAUWELS, Big Business with Hitler, Éditions Aden, February 2013.
page 184 et seq.
The Treaty of Versailles of 1919 forced defeated Germany to pay war reparations to France and Belgium. The French and Belgians urgently needed this capital in order to pay off the enormous war debts they had incurred with the British vis-à-vis the United States. In the United States there was a search for opportunities to invest in a meaningful way all the capital that had accumulated in the coffers of banks and large corporations. As a result, a wave of US investment flooded Germany, through new business creation, the takeover of existing German firms, or partnerships with German firms. American industrialists and bankers regarded this “investment offensive” in Germany as a prelude to their conquest of the European market as a whole.
German big business and banks welcomed transatlantic capital with open arms. They naturally sought to reduce the burden of paying for repairs, or even to avoid them. By selling large packages of shares to US banks, German capital could be “naturalized” into US capital, and it disappeared into anonymous American trusts and holdings. In this way, German industrialists and bankers could claim that they did not have the money to make the large repayments that were expected of them; therefore, it would be ordinary German citizens who would have to pay these debts. Germany also gained American sympathy and support in painful and endless negotiations with France over reparations: the less Germans should pay, the better for Americans who invested in Germany.
…/… This interpenetration of German and American capital constituted a giant iceberg, the visible tip of which was represented by direct American investment in Germany. One of the major investments was made by General Motors. In 1929, this Detroit-based company, which itself belonged to the giant DuPont empire, took over Germany’s first car manufacturer, Adam Opel AG. That same year, General Motors’ big competitor, Ford, erected a factory on the banks of the Rhine in Cologne: Ford Motor Company AG, soon to be Ford-Werke. As a result of these investments, the two largest automobile producers were under U.S. capital control. Indeed, in comparison with Opel and Ford, purely German producers such as BMW and Daimler-Bentz were only myrmidons”.
(page 190) The US-German collaboration under the Young Plan focused on a joint project: the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), based in Switzerland, Basel, on the German border. Founded in 1930, it is the oldest international financial institution. …/… From the outset, it was dominated by American bankers, together with German colleagues like Schacht. The first president of this “central bank of central banks” was Gates McGarrah, an American financier with close ties to the Rockefeller empire. The intention was that, in the serene climate of neutral Switzerland – let’s say: away from the snoopers – the main bankers of the big nations would concentrate on the extremely lucrative business – because that is what it was for them – related to the payment by Germany of war reparations “.
From 1933, Max Warburg took part in the financial management of the Nazi state by sitting on the board of the Reichsbank, under Hjalmar Schacht of which he was very close. At the same time, he was one of the major shareholders and managers of the German part of the huge Nazi chemical conglomerate I.G. Farben (American-German), infamous for the creation and sale of Zyklon B (the poison used in the extermination camps), but also a supplier of toxic gases, oil substitutes and various products, including, of course, explosives. I.G. Farben has a very clear bias in the war that is about to begin, since the U.S. branch of the firm is blocking U.S. military access to its patents with military applications, reserving the exclusivity to the Nazi side.
The “Dawes Plan” had been drawn up by J. P. Morgan, colleague of the Rothschilds, and was to grant Germany credits of 800 million dollars for the first four years. The Dawes Plan failed when Germany’s reparations payments increased. It was replaced by the “Young Plan” (named after Morgan’s agent, Owen Young). To better rob the country, the international bankers created in Switzerland the “BANK FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS”. This would make it easier to pay reparations for World War I debts: one simply had to transfer an account from one country to another, because both countries had an account at the bank. In this case, too, the bankers had a sweet tooth, levying fees and commissions for them. (70)
Professor Quigley reports: “It should be noted that this system (the Dawes and Young plans) was set up by international bankers and that the loan of money to Germany brought them very big returns.”
This is one of the best demonstrations of Machiavelli’s system. On the one hand, the bankers supported all parties that fought the war, and on the other hand, they also lent money to the Germans to pay reparations. No matter what Germany might do, it was clear to whom it would turn to borrow the money. It was exactly the same group that had planned World War I, funded it, run it and filled their pockets.
But the game went further. There was still a need for major projects and important goals. It was the Second World War! The huge American capital that had been transferred to Germany since 1924 under the cover of the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan was the basis on which Hitler would build all his war machinery.
As Dr. Anthony C. Sutton explains in “Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler”, “the contribution made to Germany before 1940 by American capitalism to prepare for war can only be described as phenomenal. It was, no doubt, decisive for Germany’s military preparedness. There is evidence that the influential part of the US economy was, yes, lucid about the nature of Nazism, willing to help and support it financially for personal gain, fully aware that it would end in war or involve Europe and the US. (…)
“Knowing the facts, it is impossible to plead ignorance. The very carefully established evidence that America’s banking and industrial circles were largely involved in the rise of the Third Reich is now publicly available. They can be found in the records and reports of the government hearings published between 1928 and 1946 by the various Senate and congressional committees. Among the most important evidence are those provided by the House Subcommittee to Investigate Nazi Propaganda in 1934, by the reports on cartels published in 1941 by the House Temporary National Economic Committee and by the Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization in 1946.
Part of this fascinating story is unveiled by the historian G. Edward Griffin: “In the years before the Second World War, an “INTERNATIONAL” cartel was born which had its headquarters in Germany, which controlled the chemical and pharmaceutical industry worldwide and to which 93 countries cooperated. It was a powerful political and economic force in parts of the world. That cartel was called I. G. FARBEN.
The IG Farben chemistry cartel had its headquarters in Germany, controlled the chemical and pharmaceutical industry worldwide and 93 countries cooperated in this cartel.
In 1926, I.G. Farben had developed a method for obtaining gasoline from coal and in 1929 concluded a license agreement with the “STANDARD OIL” (of Rockefeller). Two years later, I.G.Farben produced about half of the German gasoline and later built refineries right next to the concentration camps. Prisoners were forced to work as convicts while gas for gas chambers was produced in refineries. The I.G. Farben group was one of the largest konzerns controlled by the Rothschilds and sold huge sums of money into the German economy and especially to future SS.
The board of directors of I.G. Farben included MAX and PAUL WARBURG (of the Federal Reserve), who owned large banks in Germany and the United States. The main liaison between Hitler and the silver barons of Wall Street was HJALMAR HORACE GREELY SCHACHT, president of the Reich Bank, whose family was closely linked to the international finance elite.
In his book, John Perkins describes his own history as an economic hit man for a financial oligarchy. He explains that when the hired assassins fail to bend the country concerned, the jackals are deployed to carry out the dirty works: assassinations or coups d’état. In the event of a jackal failure, the army must intervene directly. In a sense, IG Farben was the economic hit man of the financial oligarchy of the time and the Nazis, the jackals.
Long before he came to power in 1933, Hitler enjoyed substantial support from private cartels. The most famous case is that of Fritz Thyssen, by Vereinigte Stahlwerke. In a book published in 1941 under the title I financed Hitler, Thyssen admitted that he had started financing Hitler in October 1923 with a first contribution of 100,000 marks.
In the 1930s, Germany continued to benefit from investments and loans. Drafted in 1929 and formally adopted in 1930, the Dawes Plan designated a program to settle German war debts after the First World War. It was presented by the committee chaired (1929-30) by American industrialist Owen D. Young, founder and former first president of Radio Corporation of America (RCA). At the time, Young was also a member of the Board of Directors of the Rockefeller Foundation, and he was also one of the representatives involved in a war reparations redevelopment scheme, the Dawes Plan of 1924. According to the plan, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was created in 1930 to allow Germany to pay reparations to the winners. In reality, the money went in a completely different direction, namely that it went from the United States and Great Britain to Germany.
Most of Germany’s strategically important companies had US capital, in whole or in part. Some of it was owned by British investors. The oil refining and coal liquefaction sectors of the German economy were in the hands of Standard Oil (the Rockefellers). The chemical industry giant Farben Industrie AG has been taken over by the Morgan Group. Forty percent of the telephone network and 30% of FockeWulf’s shares were under the control of the US company ITT. The radio and the electric industry giants AEG, Siemens and Osram were taken over by American General Electric. ITT and General Electric were part of Morgan’s empire. One hundred percent of Volkswagen shares were owned by American Ford. By the time Hitler came to power, US financial capital controlled almost all the strategically important sectors of German industry: petroleum refining, synthetic fuel production, chemicals, automotive manufacturing, aviation, electrical engineering, radio, as well as a large part of the mechanical engineering industry (278 companies in total). Major German banks, such as Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Donat Bank and a few others, were under US control.
4.4 Schacht’s German Economic Miracle.
But there was an unforeseen and unwanted situation for Wall Street bankers. Schacht used the old banking methods – which avoided recourse to credit and leverage vis-à-vis Anglo-Saxon banks and banking families – to rebuild the German economy. The German miracle of 1933-1937 angered Wall Street, and bankers destroyed the very economy that they could not dominate. This is similar to Abraham Lincoln’s refusal to borrow from the banks. Schacht was right to apply not only Keynes’s ideas for the first time in Europe, but also the mechanism of direct monetary creation by the state. This is no excuse for crimes committed in the name of Nazi ideology.
On fileane.com we explained the method used by Schacht in our chapter on the Full Currency.
“Germany’s unpardonable crime before World War II was its attempt to withdraw its economic power from the world trading system and create its own trading mechanism that would deny the global financial benefits. (Churchill, “The Second World War” Bern 1960)
“The great bankers are alarmed by the successes of Hitler’s financial policy, just as they were several generations ago, their families were terrified by the successes of the natural economy of Lincoln and Napoleon. What would have been commendable progress for Germany and others was in fact the main cause of World War II. The struggle between rival monetary policy was inevitable. (Carnelius Carl Veith, “Citadel of Chaos”).
Hjalmar Schacht, a Rothschild agent who was temporarily head of the German central bank, summed it up thus: An American banker had commented, “Dr. Schacht, you should come to America. We’ve lots of money and that’s real banking.’ Schacht replied, “You should come to Berlin. We don’t have money. That’s real banking.’
Makow quotes from the 1938 interrogation of C. G. Rakovsky, one of the founders of Soviet Bolshevism and a Trotsky intimate. Rakovsky was tried in show trials in the USSR under Stalin. According to Rakovsky, Hitler was at first funded by the international bankers, through the bankers’ agent Hjalmar Schacht. The bankers financed Hitler in order to control Stalin, who had usurped power from their agent Trotsky. Then Hitler became an even bigger threat than Stalin when Hitler started printing his own money. (Stalin came to in 1922, which was eleven years before Hitler came to power.)
“Hitler took over the privilege of manufacturing money, and not only physical moneys, but also financial ones. He took over the machinery of falsification and put it to work for the benefit of the people. Can you possibly imagine what would have come if this had infected a number of other states? (Henry Makow, “Hitler Did Not Want War”) March 21, 2004.
source: www.savethemales.com and http://wakeupfromyourslumber.com/node/6720
Francis Delaisi’s book, The European Revolution, was published in the midst of the war in 1942 in praise of the German economic system based – not on the gold standard or the dollar – but on LABOR CAPITAL – in radical opposition to the speculative stock exchange system of the Anglo-Americans of London and Wall Street who were suddenly deprived of any possibility of speculation and financial control over the German economy. As a result, the Jewish press hastened to declare a boycott of productions from the Reich, and the Allied governments brandished the ultimatum to Germany: return to the gold standard, or war. Chancellor Hitler did not obey and it was war.
Document: Historical Failures, IG Farben was Hitler and Hitler was IG Farben
Statement by Homer T. Bone , U.S. Senator, at a meeting of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs on June 4, 1943.
The Second World War was a war to conquer economic opportunities because of the key role played by IG Farben in financing and the rise of the Nazi power and leadership. The reports available on this website show to what extent the Nuremberg trials on the industries of IG Farben were the most important of the 13 Nuremberg trials on war crimes and crimes against humanity.
During the Nuremberg trials against war crimes and crimes against humanity, the US prosecution demonstrated that neither the rise of the Nazis in power nor the Second World War would have been possible without IG Farben’s financial and logistical support.
Today, 6 decades after the end of the Second World War, humanity has yet to find the answer to one of the greatest enigmas: how is it that none of the organizations set up to preserve the memory of war and the Holocaust after the war pointed the finger at these historical facts?
To date, these organizations have not chosen to publish either the important trials against IG Farben or the tens of thousands of pages showing the evidence and responsibility of the chemical and pharmaceutical cartel in these crimes against humanity.
US archives on the Nuremberg trial and the convictions of IG-Farben executives are available on the web at:
American hardware allows war to break out.
Document: excerpts from the book by Jacques R. PAUWELS, Big Business with Hitler, Éditions Aden, February 2013. page 235:
“Germany’s military success in 1939 and 1940 was made possible by a new, highly mobile form of war, the so-called Blitzkrieg, the “lightning” war, consisting of extraordinarily rapid and perfectly synchronized attacks on the ground and in the air.
To be able to wage such a war “at lightning speed,” Hitler needed engines, tanks, trucks, airplanes, engine oil, gasoline, rubber, and, last but not least, advanced communication systems allowing the Stuka to strike at the same time as the armored ones. Much of this material was delivered by American firms, and it is safe to say that the Führer, without American help in 1939-40, the years of his great triumphs, could only have dreamed of “flash wars” followed by “flash victories.”
Much of the rolling and flying stock of the German arsenal was manufactured by the subsidiaries of General Motors and Ford. By the late 1930s, these subsidiaries had completely given up production of non-military goods and were now producing only military equipment.
The Great Profits of Anglo-Saxon Bankers
Indeed, military production yielded benefits that exceeded those realized in civilian hardware by at least 40%. Together, Opel and Ford will provide 90% of the light trucks and 70% of the heavy trucks that the Wehrmacht will need to hit Poland, the Benelux countries, France, the Soviet Union, and others.
The German navy, for example, received the oil it needed from a Texas oil tycoon, William Rhodes Davis. During a visit to Berlin in October 1939, this earned him the warm thanks of Göring himself. And Texaco helped the Nazis create gigantic fuel stocks.
Moreover, after the war broke out in September 1939, huge quantities of fuel oil, motor oil, and other petroleum products were again shipped to Germany, not only by Texaco but also by Standard Oil. These products were mainly transported through ports in neutral Spain.
…/… Albert Speer, Hitler’s architect and later his armaments minister, explained after the war that Hitler “could never have imagined attacking Poland” if he had not had some kind of synthetic fuel that he had been able to obtain from American firms.
The Focke-Wulf mounted by ITT, as well as other German fighters, could never have reached their speed, so high, without an ingredient added to their fuel and known as synthetic tetraethyl. This magical component was produced by a firm called Ethyl GmbH, a subsidiary of a trio composed by Standard Oil, its German partner IG Farben and General Motors. In recovered German documents, the American military will be able to read that “without tetraethyl, our form of war (lightning) would have been unthinkable”.
IBM machines provide lists of Jews and prisoners in concentration camps.
Modern American technology was not only very useful to the Nazis in their war, but also their great genocidal and criminal project.
Edwin Black proved that the advanced Hollerith calculating machines, delivered by IBM, enabled the Nazis “to make lists of Jews, and others, for the purpose of deporting them” and “to make lists of concentration camp inmates and forced laborers.” There was an IBM office called Hollerith Abteilung in every concentration and extermination camp, including Auschwitz.
It is possible that the Nazis would also have achieved their mortal efficiency without IBM’s technology, as some claim, but, again, the IBM case clearly shows how American corporations made the latest technology available to the Nazis without any scruples about its use. “
The financing of the American German arms banks during the war
The network built by the Warburgs, the Harrimans and their acolytes continued to operate, until 1942 in some cases and until 1945 in others. The profits are astronomical. Unlike Schiff, who was resolutely moved by the fate of his congeners and always ready to come to their rescue, the Warburgs seem to have an astounding indifference to the suffering of human beings in general, but of Jews in particular. Were they fooled? Maybe they were anti-Semitic themselves?! Or rather detached from their admirable ancestral culture and simply hungry for capital, control, power.
The 1939-1945 War
Here we present the methods used by the Anglo-Saxon financial oligarchy to enrich itself without limits and to subject people to its world government. We are not going to repeat all the historical events linked to the Second World War, but only a few that clearly reflect these methods and manipulations in order to achieve the expected profits. The first example is the entry of the United States into war.
5.1 The US entry into war against Japan:
The Japanese wanted to lift the American oil blockade imposed on them since their invasion of China. When they attacked, they had only 18 months of strategic stock left. The Japanese were looking at southeast Asian oil, but there was an American base too ready. They struck Pearl Harbor in an attempt to destroy the US aircraft doors and neutralize any US response.
On October 7, 1940, Lieutenant-Commander Arthur McCollum wrote an 8-page memoir describing a process to force Japan into war with the United States.
On 11 February 1941, FD Roosevelt proposed to send six battleships and two other warships to Manila.
It is generally agreed that the US oil embargo against Japan quickly led to the Japanese invasion of the East Holland Indies. Roosevelt went further, freezing all Japanese capital placed in the US, providing financial aid to the Chinese Nationalists (who were at war with Japan at the time), and military aid to Britain in violation of existing international laws on war.
On December 4, three days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Australian intelligence warned Roosevelt that a group of Japanese forces were heading for Pearl Harbor. But he ignored it.
The attack resulted in the death of 2,400 American soldiers and the entry into the war of the United States. Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, 83 percent of the American public did not want to go to war. After the attack, a million men volunteered for military service.
DOCUMENT: THE PEARL HARBOR PLOY
5.2 The US is leading the war.
Jean Monnet’s role with Roosevelt during the war:
George Ball, who, before becoming Secretary of State for John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, crossed Monnet in the aisles of American power during those war years, testified:
“John, at that time, already had a little legend in Washington. His past was well known, at least in the small circle of people who counted in the decision-making process. I had been told that he did not look like anyone and in fact that was the case. I was a little surprised, he was really sui generis.” (Testimony of George Ball to Eric Roussel, October 22, 1991.)
Monnet, who, when he had an idea in mind, never abandoned it, kept up constant pressure on the Roosevelt Administration. During the spring of 1941, he was probably a determining factor in the American military mobilization effort before Pearl Harbor, one of the few to understand where Roosevelt was going and why.
John Maynard Keynes, quoted by Emmanuel Monick in Memoir, will say:
“When the United States of America entered the conflict, President Roosevelt was presented with a plan to rebuild aircraft that all American technicians considered to be almost a miracle. Jean Monnet dared to think that it was insufficient. The President agreed with him. He imposed on the American nation an effort that seemed impossible at first, but which was then perfectly realized. This momentous decision may have shortened the duration of the war by a whole year.”
The secret relations in the conduct of the war, precisely in order to prolong it as much as possible.
Document: excerpts from the book by Jacques R. PAUWELS, Big Business with Hitler, Éditions Aden, February 2013. page 248
“At the end of 1940, both the countries at war and the neutral countries were equipped with arms and equipment produced in the factories of the large American companies, either in the United States itself, or in Great Britain – where Ford, General Motors and others also had subsidiaries – or in Germany. The longer the war lasts, the better, at least from the perspective of American big business. Hitler had been good for their business, but the war he had unleashed was even better for the alpha and omega of business, namely making profits. Before the war, America’s great industrialists revered Hitler, but now they began to adore the golden calf of war itself. They did not want Hitler to win the war, nor to lose it; all they wanted was for the war to last as long as possible.
…/… On June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht finally crossed the border into the Soviet Union, powered by engines manufactured by Ford and General Motors, with equipment made in Germany using American capital and know-how – and with tanks stuffed with gasoline delivered by Texaco and other American oil trusts.
…/… So it is understandable that, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, many American industrialists wished that neither side were victorious; they wanted the Nazis and the Soviets to fight each other as long as possible in a war that would end without blood. Yet a core group of American businessmen remained staunchly pro-fascist and anti-Soviet, and hoped that Hitler’s war in the east would eventually destroy the birthplace of Bolshevism.
Though they had no idea of the true significance of the collapse of the blitzkrieg in the Soviet Union, America’s industrial leaders understood that the Germans were still going to have their hands full for a while on the Eastern Front, and that one could continue to do juicy business for an indefinite period. In other words, the Red Army’s successes were excellent for business. In the fall of 1941, the New York Stock Exchange rose steadily as it became increasingly clear that the Nazi blitzkrieg to the east was not going to produce the quick victory usually expected.
The situation became even more favorable when it appeared that one could also do business with the Soviets. Indeed, in November 1941, when it became clear that the Soviet Union was not going to collapse as had been expected, Washington was willing to provide credit to Moscow and a loan-leasing agreement was signed with the Soviet Union. As a result of the war, large American companies acquired a new market for their products.
source: page 254
the role of Switzerland and the BIS
Page 291: According to Edwin Black, this neutral country functioned in the time of Nazism as a kind of hub for commercial intrigues. Many U.S. companies had offices there that acted as an intermediary between the U.S. headquarters and the subsidiary(s) in Germany or the occupied countries. Such an intermediary could very well involve “the evacuation of profits,” as Black writes about IBM’s Swiss arm.
For all kinds of financial transactions with Nazi Germany, one could also contact the BIS, the Bank for International Settlements, based in Basel. Even after Pearl Harbor, close US-German cooperation within the BIS did not end. NSDAP member Paul Hechler served as director during the war, and Thomas H. McKittrick was its president since 1940. He succeeded Johan Willem Beyen of the Netherlands, a former head of Philips in Eindhoven and several Dutch banks, “well known for his Nazi sympathies”, who had resigned to head Unilever in his native country.
BIS managers actively collaborated with representatives of German and American companies, many of whom regularly visited neutral Switzerland. McKittrick was a friend of American secret agent Allen Dulles, who had been in Switzerland since 1942. Before the war, Dulles and his brother, John Foster Dulles, were partners in Sullivan & Cromwell, a New York law firm specializing in American investments in Germany and German investments in the United States. The Dulles brothers had excellent relations with bankers, businessmen, lawyers, and high-ranking officials of the German state and Nazi party, including some “heavyweights”; in Switzerland, they had established several holding companies in the 1930s. After the outbreak of war, John Foster Dulles also became the BIS’s New York lawyer.
…/… The BRI was the center of a spider web composed of American bankers, industrialists, and lawyers, and their German counterparts. Among the latter were many senior Nazi officials, including SS monks, a kind of party within the Nazi party. …/… A member of the SS who had excellent contacts with the BRI and with American partners, including Dulles, was Walter Schellenberg, the leader of the SD (Sicherheitsdienst, “security service” of the NSDAP) and close collaborator of Himmler…/… Towards the end of the war, a significant part of this capital (constituted by the assets of the Jews doomed to death and the capital amassed in the organization of the forced labor of the prisoners of the concentration and extermination camps) was placed in safety abroad in order to constitute a kind of pension fund for the Nazis who managed to take refuge in countries like Argentina. The BIS, Dulles, and other US figures, banks, and companies have been active contributors.
Thus, during the war, the BRI functioned as a kind of private club where American and German industrialists, their eminent lawyers, and their favorite bankers could meet in conviviality and mutual benefit, despite the fact that their homelands were at war with each other. These richly paid bankers were at best together,” a 1997 article in the German weekly Der Spiegel read, “while, far from the neutral and idyllic country in which they were found, the soldiers of their respective countries were busy slaughtering each other mercilessly on all fronts.” As Paul Valéry put it after World War I: “War (is) a slaughter of people who don’t know each other, for the benefit of people who know each other but don’t slaughter each other.”
One of the BIS’s services to its American clients was the repatriation of profits made in Germany.
This was done, for example, in the case of the oil magnate William Rhodes Davis, who made golden deals with the German war fleet, including by smuggled fuel to his submarines in ports in the Caribbean and South America. The BIS sent him via Lisbon and Buenos Aires at least part of the profits made by its German subsidiary, Eurotank Handelsgesellschaft in Hamburg.
It is also known with certainty that during the war the BIS “recycled” huge amounts of money and gold from the Nazis. For example, it paid Swedish suppliers for the “millions of tons of iron” imported by the Germans to make it “the steel needed to make tanks and artillery.” So Sweden’s big business also did excellent business with Nazi Germany, particularly supplying raw materials for Hitler’s war.
One should not forget to mention the “happy end”, or rather the “happy” continuation of the BRI saga – and of MCKittrick – at the end of the war. At the Basel bank, there was no purification. McKittrick was kept in his post. He left the BIS in 1946 to join the Chase National Bank in New York and retired in 1954. When he died in 1970, the New York Times published a praiseworthy obituary, entitled “T. H. McKittrick, a World-Class Financier.”
5.3 The Secret War
Document: The Secret War, Volume 2, Anthony Cave Brown, at Pygmalion, Gérard Watelet, French edition of 1981
General James O. Curtis was Colonel of the Supreme Command Intelligence Operational Center (SCO), the main U.S. intelligence evaluator, between late February and early May 1944. The head of the section was Colonel E.J. Foord. …/… But, from the moment he took office, Curtis, who prided himself on excellent British relations, felt that he lacked their full confidence. Curtis later confessed that he suspected the British of keeping the sources of intelligence very secret, as he did not consider himself able to perform well as an adviser to the U.S. military chiefs, not knowing as much as his British counterparts about the origin of his information.
That’s why he decided to ask Ford. Curtis claims that he remained unanswered for a day or two, and then, after a meeting at Norfolk House, Ford took him aside and revealed to him what Curtis had already guessed: much of the best information was obtained through Ultra’s interceptions of OKW communications and Hitler himself. But to these revelations about Ultra, Ford added another more astonishing one, namely that a whole part of these indications came from Canaris itself.
…/… Another thing he was sure of: Foord had told him that in all cases, Canaris was in the service of the Allies, not as an agent, but in the way that statesmen confide secrets to each other, if it would one day give them advantages around the green carpet.
This statement from Foord to Curtis was to be confirmed by de Guingand who knew more than anyone else about the Allied secret affairs and who was to declare: “Canaris was the source of some of our most secret intelligence. But I did not know at the time whether he was deliberately giving them to us or whether we owed them to our ability to read between the lines. I couldn’t know. But after the war, I heard from many quarters and at the highest level that Canaris communicated to us, for ideological and political reasons, decisions of the German High Command. ”
What were Canaris’s motives? De Guingand stated his thought in these terms: “Canaris was more afraid of the Russians than of us and probably wanted to see us disembark with the minimum of losses, in order to find ourselves in front of the Soviets with the best of our strength and thus keep them out of Germany. “
This opinion was to be confirmed, not allied, but German, in the words of General Reinhard Gehlen, once superior of Roenne and head of espionage at the Fremde Heere Ost, later head of the DNB, who succeeded the Abwehr after the war. Not only was Gehlen sure that Canaris had “had contact with the British secret services, but he was not surprised.”
“I had contact with them myself,” he explained. As leader of the Heer Ost Fremd in 1944, I asked a subordinate to communicate by radio to the British secret service in Istanbul, our assessments of the Red Army’s battle order and my personal conclusions about their strategic objectives and intentions. The British were very grateful.”
Gehlen also wrote in his memoirs “The Service” that MI-6 and the British military mission in Moscow passed information on Russians to its local agents. In particular, he claims to have received from MI-6 “by indirect means” Churchill’s appreciation of Russia’s post-war intentions in Europe. If Gehlen’s version is correct, these statements are surprising, as they would show the existence of secret communication between the British and German general staffs during the war.
Just as American companies remained in contact during the war with their German subsidiaries, the leaders of the secret services were called upon by the Anglo-Saxon big business to prolong the war. The main subject was obviously the Red Army: it was not to be defeated but it was not also to defeat quickly. Thus British and German secret services have found a way to exchange plans and information on Moscow’s conduct of the war.
5.4 The Battle of Normandy and the renunciation to capture the SS Armored Divisions.
We present these events of the Battle of Normandy to illustrate the Anglo-Saxon bankers’ desire to make the war last as long as possible. As had been the case on the Eastern Front, this objective was achieved by a surprising event contrary to the conduct of a battle: the American refusal to continue the breakthrough of the troops of Patton and especially of Leclerc to close the Falaise pocket as quickly as possible and capture all the German armored divisions, especially the SS armored divisions.
We also go into the details of the events of August 1944 on the Argentan side because a member of our family lived them in a tragic way and was saved in extremis by a group of SS then by Americans who handed them over to soldiers of the 2nd DB of Leclerc, certainly the Spanish company of the Mueve which had conquered Ecouché. Despite Alsatians, he and his comrade entered the village following the American company that liberated the valley in late November 1944. The German Army’s mail received in September 1944 by his family indicated that they were missing in Normandy. It was a great surprise to see them arrive on the day of the liberation of the village with the American army. Their personal history is confused with the Battle of Normandy and then with the November 1944 offensive and the breakthrough of the French troops from Leclerc to Strasbourg and those of de Lattre to Mulhouse.
End of our remark.
The appointment of Eisenhower as commander-in-chief for the war in Europe was a mark of financial control over allied generals. The German troops’ insistence on defending their positions meter by meter and on not considering retreat upset the COSSAC’s Allied plans established in 1943 and based on the withdrawal of German troops in the face of the threat of encirclement.
The refusal to retreat and Hitler’s willingness to counter-attack had resulted in a monumental error and the possibility of capturing all that remained of German Army Group B. Eisenhower, however, let Bradley and Montgomery do it without coordinating their actions.
Allied Command Diverges to End the Battle of Normandy
Montgomery was probably the most criticized. His main responsibility is to have overestimated the possibilities of his own armies and, in particular, not to have taken the means, beyond unrealistic injunctions, to ensure the necessary power and speed for the offensive on Falaise and Trun. The poor performance of the 1st Canadian Army was due to inadequate and inadequate training, as a result of a limited base of departure in peacetime, but also to obvious command failures. In particular, Crerar, commander of the army, was overwhelmed in this role, as was Kitching, commander of the 4th DB, who would be relieved of his command due to his inability to concentrate the efforts of his division. Montgomery could not ignore these shortcomings and had to take them into account in his plans.
Bradley’s main error, which is primarily at issue in the order of judgment of 13 August, is no doubt not due to that decision itself but to his hesitation, and his delay in drawing the conclusions from it.
At the level of the performers, Patton was then in his best period. His steadfastness did not prevent him from perceiving risks, and his ability to seize opportunities to turn local success into strategic victory was rare among Allied generals. Hodges, the head of the 1st U.S. Army, was much more classical, as shown by the example of the 3rd U.S. DB attacking German resistance points head-on, where Patton DBs bypassed them whenever the terrain allowed. Haislip, one of the key players in these events, was an example of a series of excellent U.S. corps commanders revealed by the liberation campaign.
Nor can it be forgotten that the superior commander of the Allied armies was Eisenhower. Without opening Montgomery’s case of alleged strategic incapacity, the fact remains that Eisenhower did not exercise his responsibility for coordination and arbitration. Beyond a catalog of individual errors, however, the shortcomings of the Allied High Command were mainly due to the poor coordination of plans and efforts, in a context of rapidly deteriorating personal relations.
The missed opportunity may not have been the August 13 stop order, but the delay and lack of energy with which the closure of the pocket on the Dives was carried out.
If Eisenhower approved Bradley’s arrest order on the evening of August 12, part of his staff shared Patton’s view: Montgomery’s caution and the slow pace of the Canadians might deprive the Allies of a great victory.
Patton’s battles to encircle the German armies.
With these reinforcements, Patton was able to send, as in the historical scenario, the 89th DI and 5th DB towards the Seine, with the sole proviso that the last combat command did not leave the sector before being relieved by elements of the 2nd DB, in support of the 90th DI, in the sector of the 90th DI near Bourg-Saint-Léonard. In addition, it left the majority of the corps artillery, 14 out of 22 battalions, at the disposal of the Argentan sector, instead of 7 in the historical scenario.
With these arrangements made, Caffey’s provisional corps mounted an offensive, launched on the 16th in the morning, of the 90th DI from Bourg Saint-Léonard to Chambois, assisted by the Langlade group of the 2nd DB, progressing to its right and a group of the 3rd DB US to its left. Langlade’s breakthrough took the defenders of Chambois, who was occupied in the night, and continued until the hamlet of Moissy, where an anti-tank dam was established facing the ford on the 17th in the morning. After this success, the GTL was regrouped on the 18th in the morning, first in reserve in the region of Exmes, and set off on the 19th to join the main 2nd DB at Chartres.
 The role assigned here to the Langlade group is that historically envisaged for the attack of the 17th, postponed to the 18th, but which Leclerc had ordered Langlade not to execute, contrary to the orders of the 90th to which he was attached for the operation, cf. de Langlade, Following Leclerc, pp. 177-178
We have here the main events relating to the intervention of the 2nd DB of Leclerc during the closure of the pocket of Falaise but we must analyze the events of the week before them to see the delay taken by the allies, which allows the retreat of the German armored divisions.
the dates given in this document ” a failed Stalingrad in Normandy ” do not correspond to those brought by the document below the way of the 2nd DB, the defeat of the 7th German Army which indicates that the offensive on Chambois took place on August 18 and not on August 16. On 17 August the 2nd DB was grouped around Ecouché with a bridgehead until Montgaroult.
The Allied high command wanted to see the 2nd DB participate in the locking of the Falaise pocket. From 13 August, the 2nd DB cleaned the Argentan area. On August 14, the advance of Canadian troops under Montgomery advanced rapidly ahead of Falaise and the pocket was about to close. To the south, the advance of the 2nd DB of Leclerc also closes the pocket of Falaise.
Document: At six in the morning on August 13, 1944, the forest of Ecouves was under control. And the Germans began to flee through the Chambois corridor, which the allies began to bomb.
The order of August 13 not to walk on Argentan.
On August 14, Bradley, without consulting Montgomery or Eisenhower, ordered Patton not to close his pocket by going to the Montgomery Canadiens but to go to the Seine east of Paris. If Montgomery asked for help, he would provide it to capture the German army. Half of Patton’s army then moved to Chartres and Orléans. On the afternoon of August 17, Montgomery telephoned Bradley for help and closed the Argentan-Falaise area, mainly at Chambois, where the Germans had escaped. To close Chambois, Montgomery appointed the 1st Polish armored division, the most inexperienced of the divisions Montgomery commanded. The Poles will sacrifice themselves to hold on to their last strength, but the cork will be permanently closed only from 21 August. Without Bradley’s order, Leclerc’s 2nd DB could have been the first from the south to meet the Poles and Canadians in Chambois. (Six armies in Normandy, John Keegan).
Early in the afternoon of August 13, General Bradley relayed by Patton had ordered General Haislip not to march on Argentan. The commander of the XV Corps was also to recall the elements operating towards Falaise or north of Argentan. Instead of concentrating attacks on the Canadians, the XV Corps had to gather and prepare for further operations in a new direction.
Marshal Montgomery, for his part, gave the following tactical explanation in his book “Normandy to the Baltic” (4): “The XVth US Corps had established itself in the Argentan region on August 13 and pushed elements about ten miles towards Gace, threatening the enemy flank and closing routes to the east. On 14 August, the Corps was ordered to deploy further east towards Dreux in order to bypass the enemy shoulder south of the corridor and prevent enemy forces from fleeing to the Orléans area.” It is well known that this measure was taken to oppose Hitler’s new directives of 18 August 1944 which sought to create a front line Sens-Dijon-the Swiss border.
On 19 August 1944, the Falaise pocket pass was finally closed when American troops established a first link with the hard-hit Polish armored division at Chambois. On the same day, Patton’s 3rd US Army was ordered to establish a bridgehead east of the Seine and Yonne on the Sens-Montereau-Melun perimeter.
On the evening of August 20, 1944, the staff of Army Group B reported that “approximately 40 to 50% of the encircled units had managed to break the encirclement to reach the lines of the Second SS Panzerkorps”. There were about 10,000 dead soldiers on the battlefield. The allies estimated the number of German prisoners at 50,000 (25,000 by American troops and as many by Anglo-Canadian troops).
For Meyer, Simonds had missed a tremendous opportunity, with the Falaise Road having been wide open for twelve crucial hours between midnight on August 7 and noon the following day. It was reported that only “60 men and 3 Tiger tanks” were blocking the way for Canadian heavyweights and a win at Falaise. Critics have therefore assumed that if Simonds had not been misled by intelligence, he would have gained knowledge well in advance of the situation necessary to fundamentally change the course of Operation Totalize and launch his forces on the Falaise road to encircle the German army to the west before the nascent battle of the Falaise pocket became that of the Falaise breach.
Everything is ready to resume the progression the next day, but in the evening comes the order of operations No. 3 of General Haislip. “All units of the 15th Corps in the Ecouché-Argentan area will withdraw south of Orne on 13 August at 10 p.m.” The 2nd D.B. will have to hold the quadrilateral formed by Ecouché – south Argentan – Sées – Carrouge and concentrate in order to prepare for a new advance towards the north, the northeast or the east when the decision is made. Order is therefore imperative: prohibition to cross the Orne. So Argentan can no longer be attacked from the south. However, this order was not fully executed by General Leclerc. A small bridgehead on the Orne conquered on the 13th by the platoon of Lieutenant Galley will be preserved on the road leading from Ecouché to Montgaroult.
For five long days, the 2nd D.B. will remain in the area assigned to it. It would continue to increase its hunting table by destroying or capturing many German detachments that under Allied thrust retreated from the west.
Death in the soul, General Leclerc will see the remains of the 7th German Army and the Fifth Panzer Army parading before him, taking advantage of the passage still existing between Argentan and Falaise.
General Patton did not take off, he wrote in his Memoirs:
“I could easily have entered Falaise and closed the pocket completely, but we were ordered not to… This stopover was a grave mistake…” Disgusted with not being able to act, he accepted without remorse the order of General Bradley who gave the 1st Army U.S. and the 5th Corps of General Gerow the French 2nd D.B., the 79th and the 90th D.I. U.S. As for him, taking the 5th D.B., he rushed towards Chartres and Orléans.
The pocket will be closed permanently on August 19 in the evening in Chambois with the participation of the G.T.L.
Certainly, if Argentan had been taken on August 13, the closure of the so-called Falaise Pocket could probably have been advanced by a few days, but it is also certain that the occupation of this city would have been achieved only through a series of disobediences at all levels, for Argentan was in the area reserved for the Montgomery Army Group.
One question remains. What influence did the G.T.V.’s passage to Sées have on the whole maneuver of the 15th Corps? According to the French documents in the archives, it was the leading elements of the G.T.V. who first entered the city. The northward advance to St. Christopher was only possible thanks to the reciprocal assistance of American and French units. Far from being a handicap, the overall maneuver could only be accelerated.
As for the influence that this “disobedience” had on the maneuver of the 2nd D.B. it was decisive of the balance sheet set out above. The eruption of a large part of the great French unit north of the forest of Ecouves, where the enemy did not expect it, made it possible to surprise the entire installation of the German device, to encircle in the woods the remains of the 9th Panzer Division and to prevent any organized reaction from the 2nd and 116th Panzer Divisions. The capture of Ecouché and Carrouge probably could not have taken place as quickly if the total disorganization had not been brought into the German columns and if the time to fortify around the forest massif had been left to the enemy.
General Leclerc had a good idea of this at Alençon. It took very little time for the G.T.D. to pass to Sées in its entirety before the arrival of the 5th D.B. If the maneuver had proceeded as expected by the general commanding the 2nd D.B., no controversy would have been raised. Instead, a five-day enforced inaction will be imposed on the division. This will allow him to make up for his losses in men and equipment and prepare for a new and very glorious stage: the liberation of Paris.
Commander of WAZIERS
Three Allied aerial bombardments particularly marked the inhabitants of Rânes:
Note: the two Malgres-Nous Alsaciens we are following have deserted following an aerial bombardment. It is likely that this was the bombing of 12 August, but it is also possible that it was before 12 August.
on 10 August 1944 at L’Aunay-Sorel, a hamlet located about 1 km from the center of the village; 10 civilian casualties were recorded but there was probably one more. German soldiers were also killed and wounded but their numbers are unknown. German doctors treated and amputated the wounded Germans and French on the spot. Some of the wounded were transported to Boucé, where a field hospital was then established. According to British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3 by F. H. Hinsley, C. F. G. Ransom, R. C. Knight (Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 258, this bombing was carried out by the Royal Air Force following decrypts of radio links indicating that this point was a reporting center and that a meeting was convened there at 6:00 p.m. Bad weather did not allow the pilots to see the result of the bombing.
on 12 August 1944 in La Forêterie, about 2 km from the village center on the road to Ecouché. The bombing was aimed at a German medical convoy (1 civilian victim; the number of German soldiers killed or wounded is unknown). The question is whether the bombing was a misidentification or a deliberate attack on a normally protected convoy.
14 August 1944 at the Cour Chauvin near the central square of the village (12 victims)
Chronology of the progress of the French 2nd DB:
On August 8, 1944, Haislip divided his XVth body into two branches. On one side, the 5th DB and the 79th DI to the East, on the other side the 2nd French DB and the 90th DI to the West towards Alençon. Leclerc reached this city on August 13, then Argentan. But the Canadian-American connection wasn’t there yet, it was more than 30 kilometers away. Canadians were not moving fast enough in Patton’s eyes. However, Monty hoped that his units could join the Americans at Argentan. Patton could not have overtaken Argentan, if he had, he could have narrowed the gap between English and American and locked up the Germans, but Monty lobbied Bradley to bring him into the Patton rank. He was formally ordered not to overtake Argentan.
In Sées itself, reached without difficulty on August 12, the General decides the next time. Ignoring the situation of the 5th Armored Division, he would not have hesitated, had it been late, to gain time on the enemy by taking Argentan. Here, however, arriving at the same time as us on the great square already animated by the whole population mixed with our tanks, some of its officers. Argentan automatically became their business again; and the objective assigned to Colonel Billotte, also on the national road so vital to the enemy, was Ecouché, 10 kilometers to the west who also commanded a bridge over the Orne. Billotte (Warabiot subgroup) will walk by the direct road, via Mortrée, Saint-Christophe. His other sub-group, Putz, will first take the Nationale 808 to Tanville: the General does not forget that he has responsibility for the forest, and so he will mark the entire northern edge. From Tanville he must join Ecouché par Le Cercueil and Boucé.
On August 12, Warabiot’s GTV took the lead. He takes Sées, then rushes to Ecouché.
From Tanville, at the end of that same afternoon of the 12th, we saw Branet (501st Combat Tank Regiment: Commander Cantarel (then Colonel Warabiot from August 8, 1944) 3rd Squadron (17 Sherman Tanks): Captain Branet) disappear towards Le Cercueil. A platoon of machine guns, one of light tanks, one of Sherman: the ideal theoretical composition of a force reconnaissance. At the last minute, he boarded in his Jeep one of the leaders of the local maquis, nicknamed Marsouin, who will serve as his guide.
The nerve recognition stumbles first in slack: amorphous sanitary formations that Branet, furious, yearns to make clear and return. He is not there to label and put away all those eager, bovine faces who come to his orders. And then, most seriously of all, M.A. platoons, which he scatters. In Francheville, where her route converges on the one that goes up from Menil-Scelleur, her head machine gun sees a German truck emerge from a corner of the house that takes priority on the road where she herself has to engage. She follows it and turns it on. An instantaneous half-turn of his turret delivers him the second truck, which continues after obligingly giving him his place in the column. It came to a standstill, with large half-tracks of artillery, towed pieces removed by the sudden brake, in all twenty-five vehicles. The French convoy also stopped: over the hedges he now saw his opponent, to whom he settled his fate.
The fight widens; from behind, in fact, sheltered from the thickets, some Panthers retread and refuel; two of them go out: almost on trial, in the evening they are taken to task and destroyed, two others abandoned. Branet did not even realize the extent of his success: he circled for the night in Francheville, whose mayor, a friend of his youth, came on horseback from his neighboring property to make him the honors, and that he left leaving in the morning to manage with his prisoners.
The next day, in Boucé, on the Carrouge-Argentan road, he will again hit retreating columns, which will leave behind some guns and some tanks. By fighting to the end, the “reconnaissance in force” reached its assigned goal, Ecouché, where Colonel Warabiot had arrived a few hours before.
In front of Chahains where the 2 GTs make contact, the fight is severe. The GTL liaison officer, Second Lieutenant of Valencia, lost his left arm, cut off at the shoulder by an 88-gun shell fired from close range. To the north, without artillery preparation, Warabiot attacked Ecouché, thus cutting off the path of withdrawal of the 116th panzer. Fighting was fierce in the hard-fought town; the French won, several enemy detachments were destroyed.
On 13 August at 7 a.m., Colonel Warabiot, commander of the 501st Battletank Regiment (RCC), began infiltration of Ecouché without artillery preparation, thus promoting the effect of surprise while avoiding further civilian casualties. Reconnaissance elements followed by the 1st Squadron of the 501st RCC at the orders of Captain Buis are engaged in the commune. The French discovered a column of German soldiers belonging to the 116 in the center of the city. Panzer-Division retreated northward and immediately engaged in combat. Despite heavy casualties (several dozen vehicles destroyed), several Germans managed to escape, covered by the action of a formidable Panther tank. They remained on the heights north of Ecouché from where they forbade any French advance. For their part, Colonel Warabiot’s men also valued their terrain while two platoons of tanks continuously opened fire on the edges east of Ecouché. The 501st RCC was ordered to seize the bridge over the Orne in order to secure this work of art against any attempt of destruction by the Germans and the French then managed to seize the ruins of the city.
August 13: In Ecouché, a town near Argentan, the units of the 2nd DB were about thirty kilometers from Falaise which the Canadians were trying to conquer…. Now, the 79th 90th U.S. DI soon reinforced by the 80th DI assembled south of Argentan follow the 2nd DB to the trace. It will be up to the US infantry to dislodge the German units which, here or there, could pass between the meshes of the net launched by the columns of the 2nd DB.
The Battle of Ecouché. The 9th Company (Nueve) and the 1st Company of the 501st Combat Tank Regiment (RCC) are engaged. After a walk along the small roads punctuated by a few engagements, they surprise a German motorized column in the evening and destroy it. On August 13, the 9th Company arrived at Ecouché. She catches another enemy column and destroys it. She’s fighting SS. The Ecouché position is a point in the German device. Nueve will hold the position for a week, until August 18. Fighting was fierce and the company recorded casualties: 7 killed and 10 wounded. The enemy suffered even heavier losses: 400 vehicles were destroyed, its losses numerous. La Nueve left Ecouché on 23 August. She fought in the south of Paris all day on the 24th and was stopped in front of Fresnes.
Captain Branet’s tanks, which had left Francheville, also reached Ecouché and participated actively in the killing. The rest of the Putz sub-group (3rd battalion of the Chad Marching Regiment: Captain Putz, 9th company “Nueve”: Captain Dronne) and the Roumiantzoff sub-group (1st Marching Regiment of Moroccan Spahis (Reconnaissance): Colonel Remy, Second Commander: Lieutenant-Colonel Roumiantzoff) finally met, in the morning, in the heart of the forest of Ecouves which is teeming with enemies. Cleaning it up will require the action of two American infantry divisions, 79th and 90th for several days. At the end of that day on 13 August, for the Division, the fourth day of uninterrupted fighting, 3 Panzer and various enemy infantry units were knocked over and damaged.
The Langlade group was assembled in guard against all directions at Carrouge and Ménil-Scelleur; the Warabiot group occupied Ecouché and its immediate region with the mission to prohibit all movements coming from the west. Roumiantzoff trumps on the N 158, stopped in view of Argentan by the American ban, and the route of the safety line for air intervention. Leclerc has installed its advanced PC in Fleuré. The Langlade Battle Group was ordered at night to settle in Montmerrei, near Mortrée.
August 14 was occupied by sporadic skirmishes and the general’s bad mood that the Americans were wasting time; the day was also marked by Roumiantzoff’s incursion with three AMs and a handful of infantry into Argentan. The Red Calots hang a tricolor flag on the pediment of the town hall and fold back. The Americans hesitate, in front of them the forest of Gouffern, the heights between Chambois and Trun, where the Germans settled, no doubt impress them. Meanwhile, the remnants of von Kluge’s group of armies moved eastward.
On 14 August, the Allied air forces bombed German positions north of Ecouché, providing substantial support to the French forces, which were still being fired upon by the air force during these engagements: the Sherman tank named “Bir Hakeim” was destroyed west of Ecouché, killing the crew members and 4 civilians nearby.
On 14 August, Dronne was ordered to hold Ecouché, but inadequately informed about enemy positions he had to send patrols to pick up prisoners who would speak. The Sergeant-Chiefs of Possesse and Reiter left with their groups at the castle of Mesinil-Glaize where many German and SS soldiers were reported. The castle also serves as a hospital. He is surrounded in the late afternoon. A wounded colonel who spoke very well in French handed over his weapon, the able-bodied men were regrouped and escorted to Ecouché. In his memoirs Captain Dronne indicated that the fate of the fifteen SS was quickly settled. While searching the castle, the Porpoises discovered American pilots whom they immediately released.
On 15 August, the Sherman “Massouah” tank of the 1st Squadron of the 501st RCC was destroyed in the east of the commune by a German armored vehicle. The 116. Panzer-Division mounted several counter-attacks to resume Ecouché but without success.
However, several soldiers of the 2nd Armored Division were killed during these engagements, notably on 16 August during a major German attack which was directed directly at the positions of the men of the “Nueve” (9th company of the Régiment de Marche du Tchad), Spanish and French volunteers serving in the 2nd Armored Division. The foot soldiers of 2. SS Panzer-Division “Das Reich” attacked again the following afternoon 17 August but without more success.
During the three days of August 15-17, the Division units, spread from Carrouge to Mortrée, held Ecouché firmly and the immediate vicinity of Argentan to the south. Around their positions, they clean villages, isolated farms, woods where many enemy elements remain. Some, exhausted, demoralized, surrender without too much difficulty, others fight desperately.
Above all, there was the rush from the west, this tide of savvy units, ignorant of the situation, coming to our posts. Some of them were getting their act together, gathering means, mounting an attack: Carrouge, Boucé, Ecouché will thus be hard pressed. We would stop them, and then we would not resist the pleasure of taking another step forward, of going and picking them up. We will see specimens from seven or eight divisions, the sneaky packages of the S.S.
La Nueve will be on the front line because the company has experience of close combat. It is therefore sent regularly for recognition. Thus, the Wehrmacht units were numerous at Écouché, in Orne, on the road to Paris. They occupied a castle in which German troops held American soldiers prisoners. The Nueve stormed the castle. The fight is terrible. 150 Germans were taken prisoner. Numerous soldiers of the Nueve died in this attack (Mesquida, 2008: 136).
Until, around the 16th, the rise of the 3rd U.S. Armored Division towards Fromentel and Batilly had aligned our roster. Everything was flowing back north. After Ecouché’s astonishment, the brutal stoppage and the traffic jams on the Nationale 24 bis where the carnage of Buis had been prolonged and amplified by that of the air force, the German columns had curtailed as well as badly by the secondary roads which, passing between Argentan and Falaise, brought them back to Trun, where they met a national road towards Bernay and the Lower Seine. On the southernmost of these roads, as far as Occagnes, our artillery will again give them severe lessons: to the point that they will give up almost completely, even at night, to sink like a funnel into the almost unique passage of Pierrefitte: the air force will leave them little respite.
On 17 August, the Campos de la Nueve section, located in the village of Sérans north of Ecouché, was attacked by about sixty German soldiers in camouflaged clothing who infiltrated near the positions. Porpoise Helio Roberto was seriously injured by a machine gun blast. Campos launched a counter-attack supported by the fire of half-track machine guns. The Germans retreated in disarray leaving about twenty corpses on the ground. Guadalajara was hit by incendiary bullets and caught on fire. Driver Martin and shooter Hernandez just have time to jump to the ground, it explodes. German soldiers are being searched. This is SS from the Das Reich Division. Marc’s half-track was replaced the same evening and took the same name. The Nueve is up. It lost seven killed, ten wounded and two armored vehicles, but captured more than two hundred prisoners and inflicted severe casualties on the enemy. Normans, often very young, came to join. They were welcomed with open arms by the veterans, and they learned while fighting.
The attack began on 18 August on both sides of the Gouffern Forest with the support of all DB artillery and a very important air support. However, the next day, the 2nd DB’s intervention in the field proved indispensable to support the 90th Division. Around 9 a.m., the two sub-groupings set off towards Exmes.
At Ecouché even, on the 18th, the road coming from Fiers brought the British 11th Armored Division. The battle dress and the flat helmets, which evoked the first comrades and the fights of Africa, had arrived in two lines which, without interrupting their busy and effort-saving look, but by relaxing an complicit smile, had exchanged with us their laconic “Hello”. We had departed to give them passage on the bridge of the Orne. On the other side, they had deployed, followed by their tanks. Soon the machine guns were heard crackling.
What was left of this traffic was definitively interrupted on August 18 and 19 by the V Corps joining Chambois with Canadians and Poles from Falaise. For our part, the operation, still hard, part of Bourg-Saint-Léonard and the Gouffern forest, had been carried out by the 90th American Infantry Division: the Langlade group had provided on its right the necessary armored support. We had seen, when the junction was already ensured by the two infantry, a last and desperate attempt, led by about twenty tanks, in the valley at the foot of the village. From the two sides of the Dive, which we held, the gunners, directing the firing of the very coins, had made easy cartons. Chambois will remain in our memory the typical mass grave, the one where, to open a passage to vehicles, the American, practical, cleared the corpses with the Bulldozer. By then, the 8th U.S. Infantry Division had captured Argentan.
On 20 August, Massu’s men stopped at Hill 262, Minjonnet’s at Frénée, and the battle of Normandy was over for the 2nd DB. It cost him 133 killed, 648 wounded, 85 missing, 76 armored vehicles, 7 cannons, 27 half-tracks and 133 vehicles destroyed; in front of it, the enemy had 4,500 killed, 8,800 prisoners, 117 tanks, 79 guns, 750 vehicles.
Chronology of the fights for the American units surrounding the 2nd DB.
from 10 to 14 August 1944:
The 90th Division in four days (which we recall followed the 2nd DB) recovered 13,000 prisoners and 1,000 horses. The incomplete destruction inventory noted that in addition to 1,800 dead horses, 220 tanks, 160 self-propelled artillery pieces, 700 towed artillery pieces, 130 anti-aircraft guns, 130 half-track vehicles, 5,000 motor vehicles, and 2,000 carts had been destroyed or damaged; in addition high-power radio sets and cryptographic assemblies, mobile artillery stores, medical laboratories, and field surgical facilities had been abandoned (3)
August 13, 1944: the liberation of Rânes:
The SS of the Leibstandarte blocked the Americans in front of Rânes After having repelled the final German offensive on Mortain, the 3rd US Armored Division gathered near Mayenne and embarked on the great maneuver of encircling the German armies. On Sunday, August 13, General Doyle O. Hickey divided his Combat Command A into two Task Forces: X and Y. On the road to Carrouge, the Americans met the French of the 2nd Armored Division. In accordance with orders, Task Force X, commanded by Colonel Leander Doan, sailed towards Rânes without taking care of its rear; elements of the 2.Panzer-Division are located east of Rânes and Lougé-sur-Maire. At the end of the day, an American reconnaissance patrol reached Rânes, and found that the city was held by the Germans, albeit weakly. On the night of August 13-14, units of the 1.SS-Panzer-Division arrived in reinforcement and launched a violent armored attack at Mesnil-Angot; Task Force X was isolated.
The situation of Task Force X became critical, the GIs had to repel several German assaults; air support was decisive; the proximity of the fighters caused some casualties among the Americans, a bomb of a P47 aircraft fell within fifty meters of the PC of General Hickey. The 3rd Battalion of the 33rd Armored Regiment attacked Rânes from the west, fighting was fierce against the SS Leibstandarte. Late in the afternoon, contact was finally established with Task Force X. To the south, the BAC struggled to capture Joué-du-Bois.
On the morning of August 15, the Americans made little progress towards Fromentel; at Rânes, the SS withdrew, the Americans eliminated the last defenders and entered the city at noon. The inhabitants emerge from their shelters, the many wounded are taken care of by a sanitary unit installed on the periphery. But the city is still under fire from German guns.
August 15: The 90th DI holds the front at Alençon and the 2nd DB operates south of Argentan by moving close to CARROUGES. The enemy exerted considerable pressure in this area to try to keep an open passage allowing the retreat of the principal of these forces while the XIX F.A.T. bombed the German sector.
On 15 August, General Montgomery announced that he had given the order to close the Falaise pocket between Trun and Chambois, this order being obligatorily applicable to the V U.S. Corps commanded by General Gerow while his superior, General PATTON, was not aware.
After a reorganization of the chain of command that linked on August 16, 1944, Gerow to the 1st U.S. Army (this reorganization is essential since all supplies of Gerow’s troops now fall under the 1st Army) Gerow was summoned to the headquarters of the 1st Army and took his orders there, then went to search for his troops in the early morning of August 17, 1944. In order to carry out this attack, Gerow wanted to control the heights of the line to be conquered (a point that the enemy headquarters neglected and that they will pay dearly). To do this, he had to reconquer Bourg-Saint-Léonard, which was executed at nightfall by the 90th DI mistress of the starting base at midnight.
While the 2nd DB must hold the Argentan-Ecouché line firmly, the 80th DI (essentially the 318th RI) must encircle and take Argentan and the 90th DI must cut the Chambois route by capturing the heights. But the 318th IR failed in his enterprise, lost four tanks and suffered much damage and gave up after asking for artillery assistance. On the other hand, the 90th DI managed to cut off the road to Chambois, but could not go further, stopped by the 8th Werfer Brigade and some tanks of the 116th Panzer Division, which took advantage of this to escape the elements of the train and all its artillery (assault guns in particular). LVIII Panzerkorps HQ also evacuated the pocket that night.
August 17, 1944 The liberation of Brice under Rânes:.
The American advance was blocked for four days by the resistance of the German forces in the nearby Rânes woods. This was followed by a double canonade of the commune of Saint-Brice, both German and American, the population being huddled in relatively protective trenches. For thirty-six hours, without discontinuity, the rain of shells spared only a few plots. Two civilians were found killed and more than a hundred animals buried in bomb holes.
01/06/2016 Author: Nicolas Mengus
Summary chronology of events in the German armies.
On 11 August 1944, German defense in northern France began to collapse, and Field Marshal Gunther von Kluge, commander-in-chief for the West, told Berlin that he believed that the continuation of Mortain’s counterattack – which had been launched on Hitler’s orders only four days earlier – was no longer practicable.
That afternoon, the Führer had given his approval for the temporary transfer of the Eberbach Panzer Group from the Mortain area so that it could be used to destroy the American spearheads that had opened a path in the vulnerable points of the German Seventh Army.
As a participant in this transfer, Major General SS Teddy Wisch, who commanded the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (LAH), was ordered to defend a line from La Ferté-Macé to Carrouge. His division had already suffered severely during the fighting in Normandy, but there was no respite. The LAH was to hold the southern flank while behind it the 2nd Panzer Division was to defend the west bank of the Orne as far south as the town of Ecouché where the 116th Panzer Division was to take responsibility.
The Leibstandarte movement began an hour later at 11 a.m. Despite the traffic-clogged roads and artillery clashes on its way to Domfront, the bulk of the LAH was in position on the morning of August 13. Detachments of the 1st SS Panzer Regiment and the 3rd SS Panzer Grenadier Battalion in armored personnel carriers (SPWs) were in the Carrouge area; other elements of the 1st SS Panzer Regiment were in Rânes, and a mish-mash of SS Panzer sub-units were in and around La Ferté-Macé. Wish’s headquarters was located near Rânes, but he was unable to give orders to two companies of the Divisional Reconnaissance Battalion and the Second SS Panzer Grenadier Battalion of the First Regiment that were south of Argentan.
On the 14th, the day that the second Canadian operation to take Falaise was launched (Operation Tractable), more Leibstandarte subunits filled their gap on the bulk of the division and a sort of defense was established in an approximate square perimeter of Lonlay at La Ferté-Macé and Carrouge at Rânes. It is known that at least parts of the following companies of the LAH were present: 1st, 5th, 7th and 8th panzer; 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th reconnaissance; 6th, 7th, 8th and 11th of the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment; 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 14th and 15th of the Second; the Headquarters and the 1st Company of the 1st SS Pioneer Battalion; elements of the 1st Battalion on SS Sturmgeschütz; all the flack batteries; and finally, the 8th Artillery Battery.
La Ferté-Macé fell to the Americans at 4 p.m. on the 14th, and at midnight the LAH held a line that went roughly from Mont d’Hère to the west to a point 4 kilometers from La Chaux, passing through Beauvain. It was opposed to elements of the 90th American Infantry Division and the 2th French Armored Division, and also, by a strange whim of fate, to its old opponent of Mortain’s counter-attack, the 3rd American Armored Division [Third Armored Division], which advanced north of the Carrouge-Rânes axis. Two task forces from this division reported that they had encountered strong resistance at Rânes on the 14th, and were unable to break it.
On that night as well as on the previous night, elements of the 2nd SS Panzer Division in Reich passed through the LAH on their way to the east of the Dives where they were forming part of a major counterattack force.
During the confused fighting of the 15th, Wish’s men tried to hold a sort of S-shaped line of defense that went from Briouze to St Hilaire, then Faverolles and finally Rânes. At the end of the day, the entire 3rd Armored Division was in a narrow position around Rânes; its Combat Command A had tried to reach Fromentel, but according to the division’s history, “it could not go beyond Rânes”.
The following morning, on 16 August, the 3rd Armored Division launched a coordinated attack on Fromentel and in the afternoon fought on the outskirts of the village. The Americans claimed 15 destroyed German tanks and 400 prisoners.
The Allies were now threatening Ecouché and Argentan, and the only way out for the LAH was to cross the Orne at Putanges, where the Allied air forces had neglected to destroy a bridge capable of supporting the heaviest vehicles.
The final retreat northward began at dawn on August 16. Although Wish had only a small idea or no idea of the situation as a whole, his units held during that night and the 17th of intermediate positions at St André, St Hilaire, Fromentel and Faverolles. The history of the 3rd Armored Division tells that on 17 August the CCA found its way from the east to Fromentel.
Task Force 1 CCA attempted an attack on Fromentel from the southwest, but resistance was such that the city itself could not be secured. At about 5:00 p.m., when the entire city except the western part had been cleared of the enemy, several Lockheed P-38 Lightning flights bombed Fromentel. This forced the CCA to retreat and allowed small SS groups to reoccupy the center of the city. The CWB Task Force 2 was battling fierce resistance throughout Day 10. SS-Panzer-Division, Frunsberg of 2.SS-Panzer-Korps from Eberbach.
“What happened at Fromentel led us all to horrific behavior. We didn’t want that, but how else do we deal with animals that don’t comply with any law? The man who killed Rose (the Division Commander) probably thought the General was looking for his weapon. The bastards who killed my friends knew they were helpless and defenseless.
The Spearhead guys [the nickname of the Third Armored Division] may have wondered, but we weren’t really nice to the SS after that. The Division did not harm the prisoners of the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, the paratroopers or the Navy; we treated them well, exchanged drinks and had long discussions with them. Nothing like that with the SS.”
On the 15th of August, a detachment of the 3rd American Army reached the 16th at night on the outskirts of Fromentel but withdrew to the village of La Lande de Lougé, south of the railway track.
All night the inhabitants who had hid in the hedge 2 kilometers north of their village heard the exchange of artillery fire on Fromentel and its surroundings.
The tanks of the 3rd Armored Division of the 3rd American Army attacked the 17th in the morning but collided with the terrible Tiger tanks of the 10th SS Panzer entrenched in hollow paths all around Fromentel, almost invulnerable to the shots of the Sherman. All day long the fight raged, the inhabitants of Fromentel, who had fled to the North, to take shelter in the countryside, saw the support planes that sting on their burning village, heard the explosions of bombs mixed with the drier detonations of the artillery of the armored. Fromentel was taken and cleaned by the commandos, probably in the night of August 17 to 18, in any case the first American infantrymen made contact with the refugee population north of the National 24 bis on the 18th in the morning, distributed chocolate and cigarettes and fraternized by gesture for lack of speaking the same language.
She had crossed the railway line east of Fromentel [note: west of Fromentel, at Les Yveteaux] at 4 p.m. and had seized Hill 216 south of Putanges, but she stopped to spend the night just south of her objective.
Although Fromentel was bombed by the American air force in the afternoon, the foggy weather in the first part of the day thwarted the flights, and this allowed sizeable elements of the 1st SS Panzer Division to cross the Orne Bridge at Putanges without incident.
On the evening of 17 August 1944, the nasse still contained the German 7th Army, a part of the 5th Armored Army and the Eberbach Armored Group, all of which appeared to be about to be captured. Only two corps of the 5th Armored Army remained out of the trap. So 100,000 Germans are still stuck in their pockets
After maintaining its positions at St Hilaire, St André and Fromentel throughout the day of the 17th, the remaining elements of the Leibstandarte were allowed to withdraw at midnight. Wish had managed to make contact in the afternoon with the command post of the 7th Army of General Paul Hausser in Nécy. He was told that after crossing the Orne the LAH had to gather in the demarcated and wooded area south of Bissey in order to continue walking eastward, either towards Trun or towards Chambois depending on the circumstances.
The 11th British Armored Division, which had reached Flers on the night of 16 August, could have caused Wish a major problem at Putanges if it had not stopped every night and had persevered on its way across the Orne. She did reach Putanges to see the bridge explode on August 18 at 11:50.
At 12:37 the forward elements of the 33rd Armored Regiment, part of the 3rd American Armored Division, reached the outskirts of the city and it appeared that the road that had allowed the Germans to escape was closed. The British believed that at least one German battalion was defending the right bank; but at midnight, when one of their units finally attacked, it met no opposition – the LAH had left!
By the dawn of August 18, the bulk of the 7th German Army had planned to cross the Orne, and many support and reserve units – including most of those of the LAH – were already east of the Dives. But with the remains of 13 divisions still inside the trap that became known as the Pocket of Falaise, the retreat of the Germans to Vimoutiers would become a real flood.
Excerpt from Escape from Normandy by Major General Michael Reynolds, WWII History Magazine, July 2005
August 18: The British advance on the road from Falaise to Argentan.
After August 18, the fighting took place in a plain, which favored attacks by Allied aircraft and artillery. There is one last line of hills to cross for the Germans before escaping from the pocket.
On the night of August 19 the Germans made a breakthrough but the fighting of August 20 will be terrible as Allied tanks blocked more and more roads. The German breakthrough continued on the night of 20 August in the sector of Coudehard and the encircled troops managed to find before dawn the reconnaissance battalion of the Das Reich which counterattacked from Vimoutiers in an attempt to keep open the breach and allow the exit of the encircled.
On the 21st at dawn 2 km east of Mont-Ormel the advanced elements of Das Reich take charge of the remains of the Frunsberg.
The German army has the experience to break a circle.
It was a way of doing him a favor when on 6 April 1944, during the German breakthrough to exit the pocket of Kamenets-Podolskiy which had been closed on the evening of 30 March, Frunsberg had attacked to break the encirclement.
Paul Hausser’s 2nd SS Pz Corps, on April 6, kidnapped Bouczacz and began to pursue the Soviets, determined not to give them any respite. From 5 pm the 10th Pz SS Div Frunsberg of the Gruppenführer Von Treuenfeld broke the last Soviet positions and made its junction with the 6th Pz of the 1st Pz Army.
Thus the 1st Pz Army was saved and its 22 Divisions. Zhukov saw the extent of the damage. He waited for victory in the South and he found defeat in the North. 460 tanks and 48,500 men remained on the sidelines, while the Germans lost 112 tanks and 6,400 men. General Hube’s plan to break a circle had worked to total surprise. This plan was selected as a model to be taught in war schools.
This success in a highly compromised situation had the consequence that Hitler wanted to recommence this strategy, notably during the counter-attack towards Mortain in early August 1944 in Normandy. But it was a defeat and the beginning of the end for the Germans.
In Normandy, Hausser commanded the 7. Gun with 1 and 2. SS-Panzer-Division (Das Reich). The 2nd SS Pz Corps which included the Frunsberg (10. SS-Panzer-Division) and the Hohenstaufen (9. SS-Panzer-Division) was part of 5. Panzer Amee commanded by Eberbach.
Then during the Falaise Pocket fights, a fighting group was formed to delay the advance of the allies, the Eberbach group which was supported by Frunsberg, especially during the Fromentel fights. These delay fights had enabled the SS-Panzer-Division of 7. The Das Reich had the mission of counterattacking to break the encirclement as long as possible.
These German troops had all been engaged in fighting in the Kamenets-Podolskiy pocket. They had learned how to get by and break a circle. Without panic as was the case at the beginning of the encirclement in March 1944 in Ukraine, they helped each other, sacrificed to save as many men and materials as possible, especially the tanks that remained operational, the Panthers.
But this experience to break a circle only served to get out of the pocket around August 19 and 21, at the very end of the fighting, when finally the allies managed to lock the exit of the pocket at Mont-Ormel. Nearly a week after the battle began and the real possibility of closing the pocket.
This lost week allowed the German troops to reorganize themselves to fight fiercely… and make the war last all the more especially as these SS tanks will face the English during the Battle of the Bridges on the Rhine in the Netherlands with the consequence of the failure of this English operation, just as they will face the Americans during the Battle of the Ardennes in December and January 1945. By 13 August 1944, they could have been destroyed or captured in Normandy.
Conclusion on the Battle of Normandy
The question remains as to how the Allies lost the opportunity to capture the entire German Army B in Normandy: the accumulation of errors on the ground cannot be an excuse because the Allied troops were able to close the pocket as early as 13 August 1944.
The commander-in-chief thus became responsible and the way the Americans sought to place the blame on Montgomery became suspect since it was the American army of Patton with the French 2nd DB that had in hand the fate of the encirclement as early as August 13. On 19 August the GTL of Langlade will help as planned the advance of the 90th American Infantry Division to close the pocket and it will go as far as the road Chambois/Vimoutiers before withdrawing as Leclerc ordered it to remain ready to advance on Paris as soon as possible.
The Canadians had false information issued by Eisenhower’s staff and lacked the experienced reserves to successfully capture the German divisions as a lock in this encirclement maneuver from August 19 and join with the American south.
For a week after August 12 and 13, the priority for the French is the liberation of Paris. We recall that on 17 August, a group of resistance fighters was massacred at the Bois de Boulogne waterfall in Paris. This event is reported on fileane.com in our document The Widow of Lieutenant FFI. The Paris insurrection began on 19 August.
The pocket closed definitively around August 14, 17 August Paris could have been released. With orders from Bradley and Eisenhower to wait to close the pocket, the German tanks began their retreat on the night of August 15 to August 16, and the pocket was not closed until August 21. The fighting will end on August 22.
Leclerc’s advance towards Paris began on 21 August with the dispatch of the Guillebon detachment to Paris for reconnaissance. The order to advance on Paris was acquired on the evening of August 22 during Leclerc’s meeting with Bradley. Before this meeting, Leclerc had spoken with an escaped officer from Paris. On the morning of August 23, the Division headed for Paris. On 25 August the division entered Paris. It would have left on the 15th in the morning, the 17th in the morning it entered Paris and probably faster because the destruction of the German armies in Normandy would have prevented other German resistance in the region.
For all serious explanation, many historians have concluded that it was Eisenhower who allowed Normandy’s SS divisions to escape at the behest of American political and financial decision-makers, so as to drag the war on as long as possible to amass as much profit as possible.
After May 8, 1945, General Patton sought explanations for the wartime wartime warfare’s tortuous military conduct to find out the true decision-makers and those responsible for the illogical strategy that quickly left the field open to Soviet troops over Eastern Europe. His accidental death in December 1945 settled well the affairs of Wall Street financiers, but the causes of this accident remained suspect and the elimination of this general who became too curious remains plausible.
When we know today the close relations between the Wall Street bankers and the Nazis, as other historians admit, we can believe that the divisions of German elites were given the opportunity to escape from Normandy to prolong the war and resist as much as possible the Soviet armies.
It was not only IG Farben’s chemical plants owned by Wall Street financiers that were spared: the SS was also protected for its role as spearhead against communism.
The aim of the Anglo-Saxon financial oligarchy has always been to make wars last as long as possible in order to maximize its phenomenal enrichment during military conflicts. When the question arose of capturing the entire German army in Normandy, the length of the war and the Yalta agreements gave the answer: Patton should not be able to sink into Berlin in three weeks, before continuing on to Moscow.
5.5 The Eisenhower Decision of 24 November 1944 in Saint-Dié
to prohibit the crossing of the Rhine in early December 1944.
Did Eisenhower really contribute to a rapid end to fighting in late 1944?
The book by Dominique-François Bareth “The secret decision of Eisenhower Saint-Dié-24 November 1944 In Alsace and Lorraine, the sacrificed victory”, editions la Nuée Bleue, Strasbourg 2019, reveals that the only breakthroughs of the front during the general offensive of October-November 1944 were carried out by the French troops: Leclerc under command of the VII th Army of Patch and the 15th Corps of Haislip which liberates Strasbourg and the first French Army of Lattre under command of the 6th Army Group of Devers that liberated Belfort and Mulhouse.
Devers presented the plan to cross the Rhine at several places downstream from Strasbourg in the first week of December, once the complete liberation of Alsace had been achieved since the disbanded German army no longer presented serious resistance in mid-November 1944 in Alsace. We must take advantage of these few days to capture the German army in Alsace and immediately cross the Rhine, everything is ready for Devers and especially for Patch.
But Eisenhower had no such plan at all, on the contrary he wants his friends Bradley and especially Patton to be the first to enter Germany and receive the honors of the final victory. As a result, he ordered that the US infantry divisions and the 2nd DB go to help Patton in Lorraine who was stopped in front of the Siegfried line. The Germans were able to strengthen and stay in Alsace during the winter of 1944-1945 and, above all, could trigger the Ardennes offensive.
Jacques Pauwels’ book “Big business with Hitler” demonstrates the global plan since 1918 to wage a second world economic war and destroy both Nazi-led Europe and the Soviet Union, a war that must be as long as possible for the interests of the arms industry and American financiers and the City of London. We saw this earlier in this case.
Eisenhower, a rigorous planner under the orders of the financiers, twice decided to allow the war to continue on the French front: in Normandy when he asked Bradley not to close the Falaise pocket immediately, which would allow the German armored to leave for the most part. And now that this book on the secret meeting of November 24, 1944 in Saint-Dié shows it, a second time on that date when it was possible to cross the Rhine immediately in accordance with the plans he himself had validated with his staff.
The general plan of the American financial leaders, when the Soviet Union succeeded in defeating the Germans, was to let them arrive first in Berlin to divide Germany and Europe into two camps and to set up the Cold War, a situation which was always very profitable for the arms manufacturers and the Anglo-Saxon financial oligarchy. And this plan, we know, has succeeded decently for them but at the expense of the citizens of Europe, including the Russians.
Today, the economic war waged by this financial oligarchy continues against the interests of Europeans. The liberation of Belfort, Mulhouse and Strasbourg by the French army was indeed sacrificed on 24 November 1944 in Saint-Dié by Eisenhower and today the economic and industrial development of this region and especially Belfort is just as much sacrificed with the same cynicism and disinterest as the American military command after 6 June 1944.
In the last days of September 2019, the scaffolding of the south transept of the Strasbourg Cathedral was dismantled and the restoration work on this part of the building is completed. Still in this part of the cathedral, the commemorative plaque located near the pillar of the angels and the astronomical clock still needs to be removed. She warmly thanked the American army for the liberation of Alsace.
This imposture now unveiled, this plaque has no place in the cathedral, nor elsewhere in Alsace. It is a real affront to the French army and its generals, Leclerc, de Lattre, de Gaulle and the pursuit of a vast enterprise of manipulation of the peoples of Europe, in this case led here by Eisenhower and pursued when he became President of the United States.
In this book, the author does not fail to recount the anecdote of the explosive clash between De Gaulle and Eisenhower in late December 1944.
Faced with the threat of the German offensive in the Ardennes, General Eisenhower ordered all troops of the 7th US Army to abandon Strasbourg and retreat to the Saverne Pass and the Dabo.
General Leclerc, learning of the US Command’s intention to abandon Strasbourg to shorten the front, will do whatever it takes to oppose it. Very moved, he dispatched an officer to General de Gaulle, carrying a message typical of his character and determination: “If this (withdrawal) order is really given, we have only one thing to do, the whole Division must pass through Alsace and be killed on the spot, until the last man, to save the honor of France”. De Gaulle intervened and threatened Eisenhower to withdraw access to French ports, railways, and roads to supply the Allied troops. Eventually, on January 3, Eisenhower, convinced by Churchill and de Gaulle, renounced this withdrawal from Strasbourg. On 16 January, the German offensive in the Ardennes was broken.
The campaign of Alsace begun on November 27, 1944 in the conditions we have just seen through this book, will end on February 15, 1945. It will last 82 days in the cold and the snow. The armies fought for 45 days in a temperature stabilized at -10 with, on some days, up to -18, in a region that took on the appearance of the Far North. This battle will be particularly bloody and will cost heavy casualties on both sides. After the last fighting, the pocket of Colmar was finally reduced on 15 February 1945. The Germans cross the Rhine again.
General Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces of the West, will not stop praising the French Army: “This victory, won by facing difficult conditions of climate and terrain, is an exceptional example of the work of teams allied to combat. It is a tribute to skill, courage and determination.”
Let us admit today that it was the least of things and a rather laughable attitude for a military leader who had renounced to use the only two breaches that occurred during the general offensive he had decided and which had been created precisely by the French army and his victory of 24 November 1944, which was to spare him the fighting and unnecessary losses of winter on Alsatian soil.
Alsace shared with Normandy the sad privilege of the province most affected by the fierce fighting. More than 20 villages will be destroyed. On 24 November 1944, and for a few days, the broken German army offered no more serious resistance. By the end of November 1944, the military possibility existed to liberate all of Alsace, with virtually no further fighting. As in Normandy, between 7 and 8 August, it was possible for the English troops to sink on Falaise without any serious obstacles on the road.
These breaches that previously the armies used to expand to rush all whole and defeat the enemy, this November 24 in Saint-Dié des Vosges, Eisenhower refused to use them. Did he know what he was doing and what was his degree of knowledge of the strategy led by the financiers and manufacturers of his country?
To reach the Opel plant of General Motors in Rüsselsheim and the large Ford plant in Cologne, the Americans preferred the direct line in front of them to the Rhine… and immediately cross the disastrous forest of Hürtgen…They finally came out on February 10, 1945… two and a half months lost also since a passage of the Rhine made possible as early as the first week of December 1944 but visibly too far from the Rhur and the subsidiary factories of American industrialists and financiers.
Yet the valor of French troops battle-hardened since May 1940 was comparable to the inexperience of young American soldiers, and a warlord needed to know who to count on to hasten the eventual victory. This was not the case militarily.
It is not the generals who decide the fate of the fights but the financiers who organize them for their exclusive profits!
5.6 Trade with the Enemy:
One way to begin to perceive the Illuminati is to first look at how these people arrange themselves to be above wars, above the fray and all these sufferings that overwhelm us.
Another historical example that I highlighted in my book on the 13 major bloodlines of Illuminati is that when the US went to war after Pearl Harbor, within days, President Roosevelt issued a presidential decree that was in fact a semi-secret amendment to the Trading with Enemy Act. This amendment allowed certain people to trade with the enemy if they were allowed to do so by the Secretary of the Treasury who at that time was Hans Morgenthau. I made a copy of this archive which I took out of the Federal Code of Regulations. If they want to exempt someone, they can allow them to trade with the enemy through this presidential decree.
And who are the people who were given this privilege? The Rockefellers and Onassis, both working-class Illuminati. During World War II, all Greek merchant ships were sunk by one side or the other. Then there was this Greek shipowner, Aristotle Onassis, who did not lose a single ship while they were sailing in war zones. None of the Axis powers or allied countries dared to attack its ships. Likewise, IG Farben’s chemical plants in Germany were not bombed because they were owned by Wall Street bankers. For something like this to happen, you need to have full collaboration at the highest level. They are installed above the melee, above the conflicts they arouse for the common men.
There’s a whole book that’s devoted to this called, I think, “Trading with the Enemy.” This book was published in 1983. Standard Oil of the Rockefellers chartered oil and gas ships first to Spain, whose products were then shipped directly to Nazi Germany. The Allies knew that the Rockefellers supplied the Germans with fuel. This prolonged the war by two years. But you’ll never hear of that among official historians. There was an enormous amount of trade during World War II that was actually indispensable to sustaining the Nazi war machine.
During the war, the Chase National Bank of the Rockfellers kept its offices open in Nazi-occupied France, managing the accounts of Nazi Ambassador Otto Abetz who financed the Revolutionary Synarchy Movement, which liquidated the anti-Nazi cells in Paris.
Chase will also be in charge of the transactions of Banco Aleman Transatlantico, the controller of the Nazi Party in Iberian America. On April 17, 1945, Chase National Bank of New York was brought before a U.S. federal court for violating the “Enemy Trade Act” in the Smit Diamonds case.
On July 13, 1944, at the height of the war, Standard Oil of New Jersey filed a lawsuit against the U.S. government for confiscating synthetic rubber patents. On 7 November 1945, Judge Charles Wyzanski ruled in favor of the government. The appeal was dismissed on 22 September 1947, with Judge Charles Clark stating: “Standard Oil can be considered a national enemy in view of its relationship with IG Farben after the United States and Germany became active enemies.”
ITT, for its part, will continue to collaborate with the Nazi government throughout the war. The German branch of ITT, whose CEO was Gerhardt Westrich, the legal partner of John Foster Dulles, will supply the Wehrmacht with telephones, air raid warning devices, radar equipment, rovings for artillery pieces, etc.
In a letter to Secretary of State Cordell Hull dated 8 September 1944, the American President said: “The history of the use by the Nazis of the IG Farben trust reads like a crime novel. The defeat of the Nazi army must be followed by the eradication of these weapons of economic war.“
The SS was assigned to guard Jewish and other prisoners, and selected to kill those who were unfit for the labor of the slaves of I.G. Farben. Standard Oil President Emil Helfferich testified after the war that Standard Oil funds were used to pay SS guards at Auschwitz.
This highly scandalous question is part of the same indifference shown by the majority of the population towards the genocide of Jews in the countries conquered by the Nazis. Ian Kershaw wrote: “The path to Auschwitz was built by hatred, but paved with indifference.” Ian Kershaw, German opinion under Nazism – Bavaria 1933 – 1945, Paris CNRS Edition, 1995.
Trade with the enemy also means protecting American subsidiaries in Germany.
Document: extracts from the book by Jacques R. PAUWELS, Big Business with Hitler, Éditions Aden, February 2013. page 304 et seq.
“Bernard Baruch, a Wall Street financier turned adviser to President Roosevelt, reportedly gave the order not to bomb – or only lightly – certain factories located in Germany, notably subsidiaries of American companies. If true, this would explain why Cologne’s historic center was crushed under bombs, while the gigantic Ford-Werke plant, on the outskirts of the city and clearly visible from the sky, had the reputation of being the safest place in the city during air raids, even if, from time to time, some bombs crashed on its vast terrain. The city of Cologne had already been bombed on more than 70 occasions – including by a raid of a thousand bombers in May 1942 – when, on 2 October 1944, the Ford-Werke was attacked for the very first time, in this case by a solitary American B-17 bomber; a second attack, on 18 October, engaged two bombers. These raids caused very little damage except at the nearby forced labor camp. After that the Ford-Werke was no longer the target of any Allied bombing.
…/… Another surprisingly spared enterprise was Bayer in Leverkusen. This company was linked to Standard Oil via IG Farben. The plant produced medicines for tropical diseases, which the US military needed to wage war in the Pacific Ocean and which were delivered to it via neutral countries, including Switzerland and Portugal.
…/… IBM’s German subsidiaries were also extraordinarily well preserved in the war. The first American soldiers to reach the Dehomag factory in Sindelfingen, writes Edwin Black, happened to include several former IBM employees. They found that everything was “100% intact,” and added that “every machine was in very good condition and ready to use.”
…/… The same thing happened with the Opel factory in Rüsselsheim. It, too, was bombed, but thanks to pre-arranged sheltering, damage to machinery and other production infrastructure was limited to about 10%. Production was still at full capacity when, on 25 March 1945, American soldiers reached Rüsselsheim.
- Martin Bormann was a Rothschild agent – Obvious
The second most powerful man in Nazi Germany, Martin Bormann, was a Soviet (British Illuminati) agent who ensured the destruction of Germany and the European Jewish community…. Bormann was a British Illuminati agent from the beginning and is largely responsible for the Nazi defeat. In fact, World War II was a gigantic Rothschild fraud on Germans, Jews and the human race. The loot ended up in the hands of the Illuminati.
- How Bush’s Grandfather Helped Hitler Rise to Power
For decades, rumors linked the first American family to the Nazi war machine circulated. Today, The Guardian tells you what the current president feels after all that has followed the Trading with the Enemy Act.
Edited by Ben Aris in Berlin and Duncan Campbell in Washington, The Guardian, Saturday, September 25, 2004.
5.7 French industrialists and bankers under occupation:
Annie Lacroix-Rice’s book of revelation
Annie Lacroix-Rice, Industriels et Banquiers français sous l’Occupation, New edition completely redesigned, 816 pages, Armand Colin, 2013, 35 euros
The grip of a real mafia.
Thus, “the delegate in France for the four-year plan, Major Edinger-Hodapp, considered in March 1941, the “consequences on the material situation and the state of mind of French workers, of the measures and initiatives of French entrepreneurs and of the French economic organization” as the essential cause, with “the subversive agitation of the French Communists”, of increasing resistance to German objectives… Vichy codified and carried out “the [German] guidelines on wage measures” which were unanimously accepted by employers” (p.582)
“In short, had decided the RG [French General Intelligence] in October 1941, a real mafia of former polytechnics and finance inspectors, grouped within a secret society with international branches, seized almost all the levers of state control, in the wake of the military defeat of May-June 40. It organizes the regulated cutting of our country’s economy, for the benefit of powerful financial interests and skillfully associates certain German groups with it by means of a new legislative and regulatory framework created for this purpose alone and by which the bodies of the New French State are no longer the external services of the Worms Bank.” (pp. 22-23) “Thus a financial clan dominated the State from 1940 to 1944, delegating to its head the Worms-Indochine-Lehideux-Nervo team, which had been committed to “continental” and European collaboration since the crisis”
To conclude our observations on the Second World War, the American financial oligarchy sought to make this world war last as long as possible by wanting to weaken Germany and the Soviet Union, knowing that once the Nazis were defeated, communism would remain to envisage a third world war that would legitimize major spending on arms and the continuation of the alliance between bankers and arms manufacturers to force governments and politicians to submit to this very enriching strategy for the financial oligarchy.
end of document
5.8 After the war, Germany did not repay all its debts
Berlin finds itself in the same position vis-à-vis its European partners as the latter were at its disposal after the two world wars. According to the German historian Albrecht Ritschl, a professor at the London School of Economics, the failure to repay his country’s debts after the two world wars was responsible for Germany’s post-war economic miracle
It’s called the irony of history. “By a singular reversal, Germany finds itself in the situation in which its European partners were at its side after the First and Second World Wars: a creditor country, which will have to choose whether or not to demand repayment.”
This German, an expert in economic history, has studied closely the question of the repayment by his country of its debts after the two world conflicts. In 1929, the Weimar Republic was indebted to the outside world to the tune of 75 to 80 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP), notably to pay for the reparations of 1914-1918.
In order to be able to repay, the government sought to generate foreign trade surpluses by gaining competitiveness through a policy of deflation: a 30% reduction in administered wages and prices, a fight against cartels – “like Greece today”. “This policy was economically effective, but politically ruinous”, emphasizes Albrecht Ritschl. Indeed, it led the Nazis to power, which immediately blocked repayment.
After 1945, to ensure a rapid recovery of the economy of their new West German ally against the Soviets, the Americans changed tactics. They told the Marshall Plan countries not to demand immediately what they owed the Germans. In 1953, the London Agreements provided that the debts of the Second World War (about 100% of the German GDP of 1938) – not to mention reparations, which were not quantified – would be repaid only after a possible German reunification (1).
“Curiously, the issue was not raised during and after the 2+4 negotiations in 1990, which led to German reunification – except by… Greece,” says Ritschl. And Helmut Kohl himself said that if the 1945 creditors were to claim what they owed, his country would be bankrupt. Germany therefore did not pay.
Better yet: in the eyes of the historian, this policy was the origin of the post-war German economic miracle. A miracle based on the surplus of foreign trade… which has led to increased debts for other countries. Hence, for Berlin, a dilemma that he sums up as follows: “Forcing the latter to pay, at the risk of bleeding them to death, or agreeing to abandon his claims in order to save them.” Those of the First War, reduced by half, were reduced until last year (2011).
VINCENT DE FÉLIGONDE, published on 01/02/2012 in the newspaper La Croix.
So history would repeat itself: after Wilson’s mistake, advised by the Wall Street financial oligarchy that prepared for World War II, the debt-service issue of the 1939-1945 war still being handled by Germany would be a major cause of Europe’s current debt crisis.
When history repeats itself, we know that the invariable cause of failure is ignorance or denial of the lessons of the past. It is possible if it is a matter of always chasing after the same goal, always using the same strategy to manipulate people in order to get richer and maintain an unfailing domination over them.
Those who have prepared these wars, until now have been able to instill after the fighting the seeds of the next conflict and we are indeed today in a new global financial war which has the distinction of being more painless or at least less visible and of being less exacerbating revolts and armed resistance to fight and defeat dictatorships and despotisms.
Let’s go to part 3, the wars after 1945.